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I. INTRODUCTION
An installment land contract is a fairly simple conveyancing
device, somewhat analogous to a conditional sales contract for per-
sonal property' and is the most commonly used substitute for the
purchase money mortgage or deed of trust.' The vendor agrees to
convey the described premises upon payment by the purchaser of a
specified purchase price and upon performance of any other obliga-
tions outlined in the contract. The down payment is generally min-
imal, with the balance of the purchase price to be paid in install-
ments at regular intervals over an extended period. Like a
mortgage, installments are applied to principal and interest and
the debt may extend over relatively short periods or for periods
exceeding twenty years. Commonly, the vendor retains legal title
until the final payment is made, at which time the deed is deliv-
ered to the purchaser, sometimes under an escrow arrangement
made simultaneously with the installment contract. Some land sale
contracts call for a deed to the purchaser after a certain percentage
of the purchase price has been paid, at which time the purchaser
delivers to the vendor a purchase money mortgage or deed of trust
to secure payment of the balance. The purchaser usually takes pos-
session at the time the installment contract is executed and as-
sumes responsibility for taxes and upkeep of the property.
An installment land contract, sometimes referred to as a "con-
tract for deed" or "land sale contract," is to be distinguished from
an executory contract for the purchase and sale of land, commonly
known as an "earnest money contract," which is customarily used
to bind a sale until the closing date. An earnest money contract
binds the parties to a purchase and sale upon certain conditions
which define their rights pending closing. The contract generally
provides for a closing to be held thirty to sixty days from the date
of execution. Its purpose among other things is to provide time for
the seller to vacate and for the buyer to check title and arrange
financing. At closing, the seller delivers his deed to the buyer and
the buyer pays the seller, either in cash or purchase money notes
secured by a purchase money mortgage. In contrast, an installment
land contract is a financing device with security characteristics; it
governs the rights and liabilities of the vendor and purchaser
1. 5 S. WILLISTON CoNTRAcTs § 792 (3d ed. 1961).
2. The most recent comprehensive textual treatment is found in G. OSBORNE,
G. NELSON, & D. WHrrmAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAw, ch. 3 E (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN].
[Vol. 3:29
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throughout an extended installment payment period which
culminates in the transfer of title from vendor to purchaser.
Installment land contracts generally stipulates that time is of
the essence and provide that upon default by the purchaser in
making any payment, the vendor may declare a forfeiture. Forfei-
ture terminates all rights of the purchaser and allows the vendor to
retain all payments made on the contract.4 An acceleration clause
is usually included so that upon the purchaser's default the vendor
can demand all payments still due and sue for specific perform-
ance.5 The following provision is taken from an installment land
contract recently used by a corporation doing business in a North
Carolina resort area:
Time is of the essence of this Purchase Contract and in the
event that the purchaser shall not pay any installment under this
Purchase Contract required under Plans 2A and 2B above on or
before its due date, then after giving 30 days written notice of the
default in payment, seller may retain all amounts theretofore
paid by Purchaser to Seller. All such installment payments may
be retained by Seller as liquidated damages, which shall not be
construed as a penalty and this Purchase Contract shall thereaf-
ter be without any force and effect. Said written notice shall be
3. Usual boiler plate provisions include:
(1) Time is of the essence.
(2) Prompt payment of each installment is a condition precedent to the
duty of vendor to convey title.
(3) Acceleration clause.
(4) Forfeiture or liquidated damages clause.
(5) Right of reentry and possession by vendor upon purchaser's default.
Clark & Richards, Installment Land Contracts in South Dakota, 7 S.D. L. REv.
44, 47-48 (1962). These authors suggest that the purchaser should consider adding
the following provisions to the contract
(1) Prepayment clause.
(2) Shift to mortgage after 50% of purchase price paid.
(3) Vendor to furnish certificate of marketable title early in the contract
period.
(4) Payments tied to farm income.
(5) Grace period to pay installments after their due date.
4. Subject to ameliorating judicial doctrines and anti-forfeiture legislation in
some states. See, e.g., statutes and theories discussed in Union Bond & Trust Co.
v. Blue Creek Redwood Co., 128 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
5. Typical provisions are found in 16 AM. JuR. LEGAL FORMS 2D §§ 219.642,
219.765, 219.766 (1973). Interestingly, 2 R. DOUGLAS, DOUGLAS FORMS 2D, No. 579
(1953) (North Carolina forms), does not provide for forfeiture, but rather for ap-
pointment of a trustee upon default and foreclosure by the trustee under power of
sale.
1981]
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considered complete when mailed via first class mail, postage pre-
paid, to the Purchaser at the address hereinafter set forth.6
The similarity between the installment land contract and the
purchase money mortgage is readily apparent: the vendor under
the land contract is the analogue of the mortgagee in a purchase
money mortgage; the purchaser occupies the same relative position
as the mortgagor.7 Unlike the mortgage, the most important inci-
dent of which is the mortgagor's equity of redemption, the install-
ment land contract allows forfeiture by the weight of authority
upon default by the purchaser.6 The vendor, by summary proceed-
ings analogous to strict foreclosure, can keep the land, together
with any improvements and all installments paid. Forfeiture is the
principal incident of the installment land contract, the principal
subject of litigation concerning use of the installment land contract
and the principal topic of scholarly treatments criticizing unre-
strained use of this financing device.
Generally, installment land contracts have not proven to be
popular in North Carolina;' their recent ° use in this state has ap-
6. Watauga County, North Carolina, Register of Deeds, Book 153, Page 846-
850.
7. Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 155 S.E.2d 532 (1967); 1 G. GLENN
MORTGAGES § 15.1 (1943); Vanneman, Strict Foreclosure of Land Contracts, 14
MINN. L. REv. 342, 343 (1930). Throughout this article the term "mortgage" will
be used as a generic term embracing deeds of trust.
8. The minority position is that forfeiture will not be enforced when the
amount forfeited exceeds the vendor's damages caused by the purchaser's breach
and other benefits received by the purchaser at the expense of the vendor, e.g.,
Freedman v. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Matthias Parrish, 37 Cal. 2d
16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951) (Traynor, J.); Pierce v. Staub, 78 Conn. 459, 62 A. 760
(1906); Lytle v. Scottish-Am. Mortgage Co., 122 Ga. 458, 50 S.E. 402 (1905). See
Annot. 31 A.L.R.2d 8 (1953). The "weight of authority" is represented mostly by
cases of mature vintage. Courts and legislatures have made such inroads on the
forfeiture doctrine that the general rule allowing it cannot be relied on by vendors
anywhere. OSBORNE, NELSON & WHrrmm, at 81.
9. The usual land purchase financing method used in this state is the deed of
trust with power of sale. Since Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C.
1975) (statutory requirements of newspaper advertising and posting notice of
foreclosure not sufficient to meet due process requirements) and the legislative
response, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 492, foreclosure under power of sale is accom-
plished by: filing a special proceeding with the clerk of the superior court in the
county where the land lies (court costs $15.00); serving notice of foreclosure hear-
ing at least ten days before hearing upon those entitled to notice; posting notice
of hearing; hearing on question of foreclosure before clerk of superior court; post-
ing and publishing notice of sale for thirty days unless deed of trust specifies a
[Vol. 3:29
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parently been limited largely to sales of resort property by land
companies.11 Since late 1979 however, rising interest rates have led
to the use of installment land contracts, or variations, in more con-
ventional situations. Interest rates in excess of seventeen percent
on long-term mortgage home loans have greatly increased the de-
mand for low equity financing and secondary financing by land-
owners, especially those selling encumbered property subject to
deeds of trust securing notes having relatively low interest rates.
However, not all such deeds of trust can be assumed.12 In the
past few years, North Carolina lending institutions almost uni-
formly have begun to include, and frequently to enforce, "due on
sale" clauses in their deeds of trust.13 A "due on sale" clause gives
different time; holding sale and any subsequent re-sales. Unless there is a re-sale,
the procedure customarily requires about 45 to 60 days. Re-sale procedure usually
requires about 30 days. See Note, Real Property, Changes in North Carolina
Foreclosure Law, 54 N.C. L. Ruv. 903 (1976).
It should be noted that North Carolina has an anti-deficiency judgment stat-
ute which governs purchase money mortgages and deeds of trust. See infra note
70.
10. The forfeiture doctrine of the installment land contract evolved during
the laissez-faire movement in the nineteenth century when ". . . the classical
chancellor who created the equity of redemption in the face of the strict law and
who said that 'necessitous men are not . . . free men,' had given place to judges
who regarded individual freedom of contract as fundamental in any civilized sys-
tem of law and enforced the harshest of contract provisions without hesitation or
searching of conscience unless constrained by binding precedent to relieve against
them." Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by
Contract: II, 44 YALE L.J. 754, 776 (1935). Use of the installment land contract
was not unusual in North Carolina during the nineteenth century and a look at
the grantor index in the Register of Deeds office of any county of this state during
that period will reveal numerous entries of "Bond for Title."
11. See Comment, Attacking the "Forfeiture As Liquidated Damages"
Clause in North Carolina Installment Land Sales Contracts As An Equitable
Mortgage, Penalty and Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice, 7 N.C. CEN. L.J.
370 (1975).
12. The term "assume" is used here loosely and interchangeably with the
term "subject to" although there is a substantial distinction. Where there is an
"assumption" the transferee of the mortgaged property becomes personally and
primarily liable on the debt; where the property is simply transferred "subject to"
the mortgage, the transferee does not become personally liable and the transferor
remains primarily liable on the debt. See J. WEBSTER, REAL PROPERTY LAW IN
NORTH CAROLINA §§ 241, 242 (1971).
13. The FNMA/FHLMC form for North Carolina, 1 to 4 family dwelling, is
most typical:
Transfer of the Property, Assumption. If all or any part of the Prop-
erty or an interest therein is sold or transferred by Borrower without
19811
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the lender the power to accelerate the indebtedness secured by the
deed of trust, making it payable in full upon the date of any trans-
fer of the- property. The power to accelerate payment prevents the
assumption by a potential purchaser of the vendor's deed of trust
in conjunction with a sale of the property without the lender's con-
sent. Installment land contracts have been utilized in this situation
in an attempt to circumvent the effect of the "due on sale" clause
in the seller's deed of trust,' 4 on the theory that there is no "sale"
because a deed was not delivered and legal title did not pass.
Whether an installment land contract is a legitimate or effec-
tive device for circumventing the "due on sale" clause of a deed of
Lender's prior written consent, excluding (a) the creation of a lien or
encumbrance subordinate to this Deed of Trust, (b) the creation of a
purchase money security interest for household appliances, (c) a transfer
by devise, descent or by operation of law upon the death of a joint tenant
or (d) the grant of any leasehold interest of three years or less not con-
taining an option to purchase, Lender may, at Lender's option, declare
all the sums secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately due and
payable. Lender shall have waived such option to accelerate if, prior to
the sale or transfer, Lender and the person to whom the Property is to be
sold or transferred reach agreement in writing that the credit of such
person is satisfactory to Lender and that the interest payable on the
sums secured by this Deed of Trust shall be at such rate as Lender shall
request. If Lender has waived the option to accelerate provided in this
paragraph 17, and if Borrower's successor in interest has executed a writ-
ten assumption agreement accepted in writing by Lender, Lender shall
release Borrower from all obligations under this Deed of Trust and the
Note.
If Lender exercises such option to accelerate, Lender shall mail Bor-
rower notice of acceleration in accordance with paragraph 14 hereof.
Such notice shall provide a period of not less than 30 days from the date
the notice is mailed within which Borrower may pay the sums declared
due. If Borrower fails to pay such sums prior to the expiration of such
period, Lender may, without further notice or demand on Borrower, in-
voke any remedies permitted by paragraph 18 hereof [power of sale].
14. E.g., there are on record in the Cabarrus County Register of Deeds office
contracts recorded in late 1979 and early 1980 which provide that an escrow agent
will hold an executed deed until the buyers have made all installment payments
under an installment contract. These contracts stipulate that there is an existing
deed of trust on the property subject to the contract, and that the contract in-
stallment payments will be applied by the seller toward satisfaction of that deed
of trust. If successful, this arrangement has the advantage for the vendor, not only
of protecting his security under an arrangement he understands (if the contract is
enforceable as written), but also of allowing a "sale" at a higher price because the
unattractive necessity of the purchaser's obtaining new financing at an inflated
interest rate is removed.
[Vol. 3:29
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trust has not been decided in North Carolina.ls Courts of several
other states have held that an installment land contract comes
within the meaning of a "due on sale" clause," and North Carolina
would probably follow what appears to be the trend toward enforc-
ing a "due on sale" clause in this situation.1 7 Crockett v. First Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Association" seems to have established
that the Court will not view with disfavor the enforcement of a
"due on sale" clause, particularly in the face of a blatant attempt
to circumvent the purpose and intent of the clause. Certainly an
attorney involved in such a transaction, whether representing the
vendor or the purchaser, should advise his client in writing of the
potential consequences in the event the vendor attempted to en-
force the "due on sale" clause.
Accommodation of the purchaser and a reliance on enforce-
ment of the contract provisions probably constitute the greatest
incentives for use of installment land contracts in North Carolina
by private individuals as well as by land companies. For the ven-
dor, the principal advantage of an installment land contract is the
potential security it provides. He retains legal title and has the
15. The validity of the due on sale clause for federally chartered associations
is established in 12 C.F.R. 545.6-11(f), 556.9 (1976). The federal law preempts
regulation by the state in this area as to instruments executed after June 8, 1976,
the effective date of the provisions of 12 C.F.R. 545.6-11(f) (1976). Glendale Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978), subsequent hearing,
481 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1979). Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 289
N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976), legitimized the due on sale clause in North Caro-
lina. That case involved a commercial loan to sophisticated borrowers and the
court, holding due on sale clauses not to be invalid as restraints on alienation
absent a showing of fraud or other overreaching, held exercise of the due on sale
clause for the sole purpose of obtaining a higher interest rate was valid on the
facts of that case. See Note, Mortgages-Use of Due on Sale Clause by a Lender
Is not a Restraint on Aleination in North Carolina, 55 N.C. L. REv. 310 (1977);
Note, Real Property Security-North Carolina Deals Mortgagors a Bad Deal, 13
W.F. L. REv. 490 (1977).
16. Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Wis. Wire Works, 71 Wis. 2d 531, 239
N.W.2d 20 (1976); Century Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., v. Van Glahn, 144 N.J.
Super. 48, 364 A.2d 558 (1976); Baker v. Leight, 97 Ariz. 112, 370 P.2d 268 (1962);
Baker v. Love's Park Say. & Loan Asa'n., 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975); cf.
Tucker v. Lessen Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 12 Cal.3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr.
633 (1974) (although the due on sale clause covers an installment land contract,
acceleration not allowed because "lender's interest in maintaining its portfolio at
current interest rates" held not to justify the restraint imposed by such clauses).
Contra., Chopan v. Klinkman, 330 So.2d 154 (Fla. App. 1976).
17. See Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 713 (1976).
18. 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
1981]
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remedy of forfeiture to afford him prompt realization on his secur-
ity. Yet the vendor's security is dependent on other considerations
which may provide a court sufficient reason to invalidate its princi-
pal feature-forfeiture of the purchaser's interest upon default. It
has been said that "[If the contract is enforceable as written and
if title will not be clouded . .. [the installment land] contract
gives the vendor a very favorable remedy, much more advanta-
geous than would be available under a purchase money mortgage
or deed of trust."19 That this caveat can hardly be over-empha-
sized is clear from a survey of litigation arising from the use of
installment land contracts. Enforcement of forfeiture provisions in
installment land contracts is now the exception rather than the
rule.20 Although the North Carolina appellate courts have not re-
cently considered the question, earlier cases indicate that this state
will follow the trend away from forfeiture. 1
Most inherent disadvantages of an installment land contract
operate against the purchaser in the form of risk of forfeiture and
difficulty of sale or encumbrance. However, the vendor must also
weigh the probable disadvantage of accepting a small downpay-
ment against his need for cash from the transaction. The vendor
remains personally and primarily liable on his prior encumbrance,
if any, which is "assumed" by the purchaser. He must, therefore,
personally ensure that installment payments on that indebtedness
are promptly made to the lending institution to avoid default. The
income tax advantage of an installment sale could just as easily be
realized by use of a purchase money deed of trust. 2" Cumbersome
19. Comment, Installment Contracts for the Sale of Land in Missouri, 24
Mo. L. REV. 240, 244 (1959). See Dolson, A Comparison of Land Contracts and
Other Security Devices in Kentucky, 32 U. CIN. L. REv. 435 (1963).
20. Supra note 8.
21. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
22. If the vendor receives less than thirty percent of the selling price in the
first year, an installment land contract qualifies under I.R.C. § 453 as an install-
ment sale. Tress. Reg. 1.453-5(a) (1967); 2 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION, § 15.08 (1974). [Note: after this article was written Congress amended
I.R.C. § 453 to eliminate the 30 percent requirement. 26 U.S.C. § 453 (1980).] Use
of an installment sale may be an illusory advantage, however, if there is a very low
downpayment. Consider the following example:
Assumptions: married couple filing jointly; 2 exemptions; no itemized de-
ductions; 1979 tax rates constant; 60% capital gain exclusion for federal
income tax; no capital gain exclusion for state income tax; alternative
minimum tax not considered; tax basis in property sold = $0.00; balance
after first year financed for 15 years at 10% annual interest.
[Vol. 3:29
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foreclosure procedures which seem to plague other states do not
present the same problem in this state.28
If the installment land contract gains greater acceptance in
North Carolina, litigation concerning the rights of the parties to
such a contract will undoubtedly arise. These rights are governed
by the common law of this state, much of which developed more
Conventional installment sale Installment Land Contract
sale price $100,000 $100,000
first payment 30,000 5,000
interest first yr. -0- -0-
FIRST YEAR
Federal tax 3,591.00 2,161.00
N.C. tax 2,755.00 900.00
$6,346.00 $3,061.00
SECOND YEAR
Federal tax 3,969.00 4,944.00
N.C. tax 1,471.62 1,763.31
Total tax $5,440.62 $6,707.31
THIRD YEAR
Federal tax 3,829.00 4,736.00
N.C. tax 1,438.96 1,718.98
Total tax $5,276.96 $6,454.98
Advantage:
First year $3,285.00
Second year $1,266.69
Third year $1,187.02
While there is considerable tax savings realized the first year by use of the install-
ment land contract, the long term savings, in the event there is no prepayment, is
in favor of the sale having a down-payment of nearly 30 percent. There is a tax
disadvantage in years subsequent to the first year because of the greater propor-
tion of interest which is taxed as ordinary income. The prudent vendor will, of
course, weigh any tax considerations against the stability of the transaction.
Upon a default by purchaser and reacquisition by vendor, I.R.C. § 1038 ap-
plies to the installment land contract to limit gain and to establish a new basis for
the vendor. Treas. Reg. 1.1038-1(a)(2) (1967). Examples are provided in Treas.
Reg. 1.1038-1(h) (1967). For the purchaser, a reacquisition by vendor of encum-
bered property at a loss will be treated as a capital loss to the purchaser, Helver-
ing v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941); Burger-Phillips Co. v. Comm'r, 126 F.2d 934
(5th Cir. 1942); See Rev. Rul. 78-64, 1978 C.B. 264; Russ v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 135
(1977), a disadvantage in that capital losses cannot be offset against ordinary in-
come, but only against capital gains. The purchaser should be wary of the likeli-
hood of such a loss, for the purchaser's adjusted basis in the property will usually
exceed the amount of the outstanding indebtedness. A gain will be realized by
purchaser equivalent to the excess of the amount of the unpaid indebtedness, in-
cluding accrued interest, if any, over the cost or other basis of the property ad-
justed for depreciation and improvements. Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st
Cir. 1950).
23. Supra note 9.
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than eighty years ago. Despite langauge in a recent leading opinion
that "as between the parties, the vendor may be considered a
mortgagee and vendee a mortgagor,' 24 the law in this area seems to
be founded more on contract than on mortgage principles.25 At
common law, there is no equity of redemption to protect the de-
faulting vendee under an installment land contract .2 It is this dis-
tinction between installment land contracts and mortgages that
has been, and will likely continue to be, primarily responsible for
litigation between parties to these contracts, and which will pro-
vide the impetus for judicial or legislative reform of installment
land contracts.
II. RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF THE PARTIES UPON A DEFAULT
A. Rights and Remedies of the Vendor
Upon the default of the purchaser, the vendor has a number of
remedies,'7 but first he must elect whether he will stand on the
contract or seek rescission."8 If the vendor affirms the contract, he
can: sue for specific performance; bring an action for installments
due; foreclose the purchaser's interest by action or under a power
of sale in the contract; or simply remain inactive and keep the in-
stallments already paid. If he disaffirms the contract, he can: retain
the installments paid and forfeit the contract according to its
terms; bring an action for damages for the breach; eject the vendee
by action or maintain an action to quiet title; and, if the premises
are vacant, retake possession."
24. Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 155 S.E.2d 532 (1967).
25. See Rothenberg v. Follman, 19 Mich. App. 383, 172 N.W.2d 845 (1969).
26. Id. See G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §§ 5-7, 20 (2d ed. 1970) (development of
the equity of redemption in mortgage law).
27. Supra note 24 at 73-4, 155 S.E.2d at 541. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§§ 11.66-11.77 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 8A G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 4464
(1963 repl.); C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 186 (1935); Spencer, Remedies Available
Under a Land Sale Contract, 3 WUEL.AiarE L.J. 164 (1965); Lee, Remedies for
Breach of the Installment Land Contract, 19 U. MIAMI L. REV. 550 (1965); Com-
ment, Forfeiture: The Anomaly of the Land Sale Contract, 41 ALBANY L. REv. 71
(1977); 92 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 543 (1955). See Note, Reforming the Ven-
dor's Remedies for Breach of Installment Land Sale Contracts, 47 So. CAL. L.
REv. 191 (1973); Comment, Remedies of the Vendor and Purchaser under a Con-
tract for the Sale of Realty in Pennsylvania, 10 VILL. L. REV. 557 (1965).
28. Supra note 24.
29. For an excellent analysis of remedies under the installment land contract
see Comment, Forfeiture: The Anomaly of the the Land Sale Contract, 41 AL-
BANY L. REV. 71 (1977).
[Vol. 3:29
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The vendor's choice of remedy will probably depend in large
part upon the anticipated response of the purchaser, but will also
be governed by the economic realities of the situation. For in-
stance, if the land has substantially appreciated and the purchaser
has moved away to parts unknown, forfeiture may be a good alter-
native. If the premises have substantially appreciated and the ven-
dor has liquid cash to refund installments made, the vendor faced
with a contentious purchaser may elect to rescind the contract.
Foreclosure gives the purchaser the benefit of the appreciated
value of the property but allows the vendor the dubious advantage
of being able to pursue a deficiency in the event the premises have
depreciated.
1. Vendor's Disaffirmance
a. Forfeiture
The doctrine of forfeiture, based on the idea that courts
should enforce rather than re-write contracts,30 is recognized in a
majority of American81 jurisdictions,8' but courts are quick to de-
30. See Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of Contract, 5 MiNN. L. REV. 329,
341 (1921):
The law, while looking with righteous abhorrence on forfeitures and
washing its hands of their enforcement, after the manner of Pontius Pi-
late, yet has been reluctant to intervene with affirmative relief or to for-
mulate any consistent principle condemning the validity of cut throat
provisions which in their essence involve forfeiture. Although the law will
not assist in the vivisection of the victim, it will often permit the creditor
to keep his pound of flesh if he can carve it for himself.
But see 1 G. GLENN, MORTGAGES § 15.1 at 86 (1934):
... Upon default under a subsisting contract of purchase, the ven-
dee should be foreclosed, but should be able to redeem meanwhile; and
no contractual theory of rescission should allow the vendor to keep the
land, and at the same time hold the vendee on his defaulted install-
ments. The contract may provide that way; but so did the mortgage have
a defeasance clause, which, on its face, precluded redemption at a latter
day, and yet we have seen what happened to that. Thus the question
echoes that was put many years ago, "Why then should not the vendee,
whose status in equity so nearly approaches that of the mortgagor, be
allowed the same equity of redemption?"
31. The English courts do not tolerate forfeiture. Steedman v. Drinkle, 1 A.C.
275 (1915). The authorities are collected in Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 8, 24-34 (1953).
32. E.g., Improvement Co. v. Guthrie, 116 N.C. 381, 21 S.E. 952 (1895), 2 J.
POMERoRY, EQurry JUSPRtUDECE § 455 (5th ed. 1941); Ballentine, Forfeiture for
Breach of Contract, 5 Mnm. L. Rav. 329 (1921).
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vise methods to circumvent its harsh results.88 Commentators are
unanimous in their criticism of the doctrine, noting the injustice of
enforcing a forfeiture upon default of the final payment, thereby
allowing the vendor to retain all prior payments together with the
land and any improvements thereon, which he can sell again.' As
the purchaser builds "equity" and the contract approaches comple-
tion, or as he adds improvements, his risk of loss upon default be-
comes increasingly onerous. The vendor's risk, meanwhile, de-
creases in inverse proportion to his contracted recovery (a
forfeiture) in the event of default by the purchaser.
Forfeiture under the terms of an installment land contract
seems to be an area of contract law unique in application. It is not
analogous to forfeiture of earnest money,8 5 and the "earnest
money" cases are not valid precedents for extension of the forfei-
ture doctrine to installment land contracts.8 6 Earnest money rarely
exceeds ten percent of the purchase price and, indeed, the possibil-
ity of its forfeiture is the very reason it is paid. Earnest money is
intended as a guarantee of performance.
Likewise, the rationale of liquidated damages is inapplicable
to a forfeiture provision. A liquidated damages clause provides for
the payment of a sum certain in the event of a future breach, while
a forfeiture clause allows the vendor to keep sums already received,
which he may have invested or lost. The rule that liquidated dam-
ages may not operate as a penalty is readily applied in retrospect
33. E.g., Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 155 S.E.2d 532 (rescission). An-
not., 40 A.L.R. 182 (1926); Annot., 59 A.L.R. 189 (1929); Annot., 102 A.L.R. 852
(1936); Annot., 134 A.L.R. 1064 (1941); Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 8 (1953); Note, Equi-
table Relief Against Forfeitures in Land Sales, 32 Yale L.J. 65 (1922); Note, The
Forfeiture Clause in Illinois Real Estate Contracts 1950 U. ILL. L.F. 249. See 8A
G. THoMPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 4474 (1963 repl.).
34. The classic article is Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to Resti-
tution of Installments Paid, 40 YALE L.J. 1013 (1931). Professor Corbin admon-
ishes (at 1013):
In these cases the following questions should be plainly put and defi-
nitely answered: Is a plaintiff who has partly performed a contract to be
penalized more strongly than one who has not performed at all? Sec-
ondly, is a plaintiff who has almost fully performed his contract to be
penalized more heavily than one who has performed only a small part of
the contract?
35. 5A A. CORBIN, CoNTRACTS § 1133 (1964); Lee, Defaulting Purchaser's
Right to Restitution Under the Installment Land Contract, 20 U. NIAMI L. Rzv.
1, 2 (1965); Lee, Remedies for Breach of the Installment Land Contract, 19 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 550, 553 (1965).
36. See text supra at 30-31.
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to a breaching purchaser who has measurably injured the interests
of his vendor-the breaching purchaser must pay. To apply the
penalty rule to a forfeiture would require the non-breaching ven-
dor, if his injury were less than the installments, to pay over
money he might not have readily available.3 7
North Carolina has not expressly denounced forfeiture, either
legislatively or judicially." Although there are examples of the
court's circumventing what was apparently a real default followed
by a legitimate attempt at forfeiture under the terms of the con-
tract,3 9 there are nevertheless pronouncements that the contract
will be enforced.40 The courts are slow to assist the vendor in de-
37. 5A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1133 (1964):
It is the difference between an agreement that a vendor shall be
privileged to keep what he has already received and an executory prom-
ise creating in the vendor a right that money shall be paid to him. It is
the difference between the executed and the executory, between posses-
sion and the hope to possess, between a bird in the hand and a bird in
the bush.
Cf. Lee, Remedies for Breach of the Installment Land Contract, 19 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 550, 552 (1965); Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 1401 (1949). But see, e.g., Freedman v.
Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Matthias Parish, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629
(1951).
38. Whether forfeiture violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment under the doctrine of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950), has apparently not been decided in any jurisdiction. Whether
there is an acceptable waiver of hearing, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, reh. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972), or state action, Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250
(W.D.N.C. 1975), may have to be decided on a case by case basis initially. That
North Carolina has no statute providing for rights and remedies of the parties to
an installment land contract and no appellate decisions evidencing a standard ju-
dicial remedy in the nature of foreclosure by sale or otherwise, would seem to
negate a finding of state action. As to notice, cf. Britt v. Britt, 26 N.C. App. 132,
215 S.E.2d 172 appeal dismissed, 288 N.C. 238, 217 S.E.2d 678 (1975) (deed of
trust); Huggins v. Dement, 13 N.C. App. 673, 187 S.E.2d 412 appeal dismissed
218 N.C. 314, 188 S.E.2d 898, cert, denied 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (deed of trust).
See OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN § 3.29; Note, Notice Requirements of the Non-
judicial Foreclosure Sale, 51 N.C. L. Rav. 1110 (1973); Note, Cancellation of
Contracts for Deed: The Constitutionality of the Minnesota Statutory Proce-
dure, 58 MINN. L. REv. 247 (1973).
39. E.g., Douglas v. Brooks, 242 N.C. 178, 87 S.E.2d 258 (1955).
40. Improvement Co. v. Guthrie, 116 N.C. 381, 21 S.E. 952 (1895); Syme v.
Smith, 92 N.C. 338 (1885); Green v. N.C.R.R., 77 N.C. 95 (1877); Foust v.
Shoffner, 62 N.C. (Phil. Eq.) 242 (1867). In these cases the plaintiff-purchaser
came into court asking for a refund of his payments, which the court would not
allow, the defendant-vendor asserting his willingness to convey. The posture of
these cases did not place the question of forfeiture squarely before the court.
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claring a forfeiture.41
In order to assert successfully a forfeiture, the vendor must
avoid any basis for a claim of waiver of the contract, either as to
time of payment 42 or right to forfeiture. 43 If time of payment is not
made "of the essence" by the terms of the contract, he must give
the purchaser reasonable notice of his intentions.44 Even if the con-
tract makes time "of the essence," a mere default does not effect a
forfeiture unless the contract contains a forfeiture clause which the
court will allow to operate according to its terms.4' The vendor
may, by disregarding the contract, lose his rights thereunder by
reselling the premises without preserving the rights of the install-
ment land contract purchaser, 46 or by resuming possession him-
41. Apparently a case is not to be found in the North Carolina reports in
which the court has actually declared the interest of the purchaser forfeited. But
see Allen v. Taylor, 96 N.C. 37, 1 S.E. 462 (1887); cf. Holden v. Purefoy, 108 N.C.
163, 12 S.E. 848 (1891); Francis v. Love, 56 N.C. (3 Jones Eq.) 321 (1857) (six year
delay by purchaser deemed abandonment). As in the last case cited, however, few
of the North Carolina cases involve either a "time is of the essence" clause or a
"forfeiture" clause. In Hicks v. King, 150 N.C. 370, 64 S.E. 125 (1902), the con-
tract did contain a forfeiture clause. There, the court refused to allow forfeiture
and ordered a foreclosure sale on the basis of the mortgage analogy.
42. Hairston v. Bescherer, 141 N.C. 205, 53 S.E. 845 (1906) (estoppel).
43. Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 155 S.E.2d 532 (1967); "If the defen-
dant relied upon a renunciation of the contract by the plaintiffs, it was his duty to
make it out unmistakably, and that he himself had assented to it." Faw v. Whit-
tington, 72 N.C. 321, 324 (1875).
44. See Douglass v. Brooks, 242 N.C. 178, 185, 87 S.E.2d 258, 263 (1955)
(" 'mere lapse of time with a contract unperformed does not entitle either party to
refuse to complete it' "); Falls v. Carpenter, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 237
(1835). Time is not of the essence in an installment land contract unless the con-
tract so provides. Where there is no provision making time of the essence, some
action must be taken to effect a forfeiture. Scarlett v. Hunter, 56 N.C. (3 Jones
Eq.) 84 (1856).
45. See Bateman v. Hopkins, 157 N.C. 470, 475, 73 S.E. 133, 135 (1911)
(dictum).
Where time is essential or of the essence of the contract, the tender
and demand must be made on the day named, and a fortiori where it is
stipulated that if tender and demand are not made by one of the parties
at the time specified, the other party may treat the contract as at an end.
Glock v. Howard & Wilson Colony Co., 123 Cal. 1, 55 P. 713, 716 (1898) (vendor
"may remain inactive, yet retain to his own use the moneys paid"); Annot., 31
A.L.R.2d 8, 83 (1953).
46. Lee, Remedies for Breach of the Installment Land Contract, 19 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 550, 562 (1965). Cf. Improvement Co. v. Guthrie, 116 N.C. 381, 21
S.E. 952 (1895).
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self.4 7 Such an action could prove quite costly because it entitles
the purchaser to an action for rescission, and the vendor may be
required to reimburse the purchaser for all installments made."8
b. Vendor's Action for Damages for Breach
As with any other contract, when injury results from the non-
performance of a party to an installment land contract, the injured
party has a cause of action for damages arising from the breach.4 9
The last case in North Carolina to consider the measure of the
vendor's damages upon breach by the purchaser under an install-
ment land contract was Garrard v. Dollar,50 decided in 1856,
wherein the Court adopted the loss of bargain rule.51 Under that
rule, the vendor may recover the difference between the market
value and the contract price on the date of the breach or on the
date at which he recovers possession. Thus, if the land decreases in
value, the vendor recovers, but if the land appreciates, his loss is
limited to his special damages. If the purchaser breaches at a time
when the sum of installments paid and the value of the property is
less than the vendor's damages, whether the vendor has a claim for
breach of contract damages in the face of a forfeiture clause in the
contract is an open question.5s
c. Ejectment and Action to Quiet Title
After default, the purchaser's right to possession ceases and
the vendor has an absolute right to take possession.5' The vendor
47. Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 155 S.E.2d 532 (1967); Hicks v. King,
150 N.C. 370, 64 S.E. 125 (1909) (repossession by vendor entitles purchaser to
forclosure sale and the benefit of any surplus).
48. E.g., cf. Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 155 S.E.2d 532 (1967) (recis-
sion theory based on vendor's demand that purchaser surrender possession).
49. 11 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1399 (3d ed. 1968).
50. 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 175 (1856).
51. This is the general rule. See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 12.11 (1973). The ven-
dor should also be entitled to special damages, including rental value during the
period he did not have possession. North Carolina follows the loss of bargain rule
as a measure of purchaser's damages upon vendor's default under an earnest
money contract. Johnson v. Insurance Co., 219 N.C. 445, 14 S.E.2d 405 (1941).
52. The general rule is that the forfeiture clause controls. See Annot., 97
A.L.R. 1493 (1935).
53. Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 155 S.E.2d 532 (1967). See Note, Mea-
sure of Vendor's Damages Where Vendee Wrongfully Remains in Possession af-
ter Cancellation of Executory Contract, 16 MINN. L. REv. 725 (1932).
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may then bring an action in ejectment to exercise dominion over
the premises." This action terminates the contract, and the pur-
chaser loses possession and forfeits any installments paid. The ven-
dor may also bring an action to quiet title15 to remove the install-
ment land contract as a cloud on title and to terminate any claim
the purchaser may have to the premises.
d. Right of Peaceful Reentry
If he can do so without a breach of the peace, the vendor can
retake possession of the premises. The purchaser's default termi-
nates his possessory rights."
2. Vendor's Affirmance of the Contract
a. Suit for Specific Performance
Specific performance is available to the vendor5 7 only if all of
the unpaid balance is due"-hence the necessity of an acceleration
clause in the contract. This remedy would be preferable only in the
event the property has depreciated and the purchaser is solvent.
Regardless of the existence of other adequate remedies at law, the
equitable remedy of specific performance remains available.5 That
the vendor may not have a marketable title at the time of the ac-
tion is no defense, assuming he can cure any title defaults prior to
the decree. 0 If the purchaser cannot or will not comply with a de-
cree for specific performance, foreclosure of his equity in the prop-
erty is proper.61
54. Allen v. Taylor, 96 N.C. 37, 1 S.E. 462 (1887); Jones v. Boyd, 80 N.C. 258
(1879); Carson v. Baker, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 220 (1833). A purchaser in possession is
not, however, subject to summary ejectment under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-26
(1976). Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 70, 155 S.E.2d 532, 539 (1967), citing
McCombs v. Wallace, 66 N.C. 481 (1872).
55. This is a statutory action in North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-10
(1976).
56. Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 155 S.E.2d 532 (1967).
57. Springs v. Sanders, 62 N.C. (Phil. Eq.) 67 (1866).
58. Brame v. Swain, 111 N.C. 540, 15 S.E. 938 (1892).
59. Supra note 57.
60. Hughes v. McNider, 90 N.C. 248 (1884); accord, Battery Park Bank v.
Loughran, 122 N.C. 668, 30 S.E. 17 (1898).
61. See Council v. Bailey, 154 N.C. 54, 69 S.E. 760 (1910); Hobson v.
Buchanan, 96 N.C. 444, 2 S.E. 180 (1887). Because of this similarity to a mortgage
as opposed to execution on a money judgment, the proper venue is the county
where the land lies. Id. But see McPeters v. English, 141 N.C. 491, 54 S.E. 417
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b. Action for Installments Due
The vendor can bring an action for each installment as it be-
comes due, 2 or for the total amount due after all installments are
due. This remedy is in substance and result the same as a suit for
specific performance of the contract. 3 For that reason, some courts
have said the action will not lie," but North Carolina has allowed
it," and the problem is probably moot since the fusion of law and
equity in this State." The vendor should come into court tender-
ing his deed and showing that the tender has remained open."' If
the vendor recovers a judgment for all or a part of the purchase
money and later terminates the contract for default of the pur-
chaser, the court should relieve the purchaser from the judgment.68
As with specific performance, the practical utility of this action is
limited to situations in which foreclosure would not yield
equivalent proceeds because of the depreciation of the property, or
when repair expenses or costs of repossession exceed the amount
which could be realized on a forfeiture.
c. Foreclosure of the Contract
A purchaser's interest under an installment land contract can
be foreclosed by action in the same manner as that of a mortga-
gor.69 An action for foreclosure can only be brought if the final
payment is due either by passage of time or by operation of an
acceleration clause.70 Because the vendor's obligation is then con-
(1906), holding that the interest of a purchaser under an installment land con-
tract cannot be sold under execution on a judgment for the purchase money.
62. Walker v. Burrell, 172 N.C. 386, 90 S.E. 425 (1916); Brame v. Swain, 111
N.C. 540, 15 S.E. 938 (1892).
63. Note, 12 N.C. L. REv. 284 (1934). See Ellis v. Hussey, 66 N.C. 501 (1872)
(distinguishing the action from action by vendor as for sale as a .mortgagee).
64. 3 AMERiCA LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.77 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
65. Brame v. Swain, 111 N.C. 540, 15 S.E. 938 (1892); Ellis v. Hussey, 66 N.C.
501 (1872); Garrard v. Dollar, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 175 (1856) (prior to fusion of law
and equity by Constitution of 1868).
66. See D. DoBSs, REMEDIES, § 12.11 (1973).
67. Hardy v. McKesson, 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 554 (1859). See Annot., 35 A.L.R.
108 (1925).
68. See Note, 17 MINN. L. REv. 110 (1933). As to deficiency judgment, infra
note 70.
69. Allen v. Taylor, 96 N.C. 37, 1 S.E. 462 (1887).
70. Brame v. Swain, 111 N.C. 540, 15 S.E. 938 (1892). The vendor should be
able, after a foreclosure sale, to recover from the vendee any deficiency. N.C. GEN.
STAT. 45-21.38 (1976), the anti-deficiency judgment statute, does not apply to an
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current with the purchaser's, the vendor must be able to demon-
strate his ability to make the conveyance. A power of sale reserved
in an installment land contract operates according to the same
rules which govern a power of sale in a mortgage."'
3. North Carolina's Treatment of the Vendor-Plaintiff
As stated earlier, the installment land contract may be an ad-
vantageous conveyancing device only if the contract is enforceable
as written. This caveat especially commends itself to vendors in
North Carolina. Courts of this state have been reluctant to enforce
provisions of installment land contracts when the results substan-
tially differ from relief accorded to a mortgagee under a purchase
money mortgage. 2 Moreover, in actions by the vendor to terminate
the purchaser's interest or to eject him from possession upon de-
fault, North Carolina courts have consistently used a mortgage
analogy to protect the vendee's "equity of redemption. 7 8 Even
when a purchaser was in arrears for five years before the vendor
brought an action to recover the land, the court held that the pur-
chaser's equity could not be destroyed by a forfeiture clause in the
contract anymore than could a mortgagor's, and that a sale of the
property would be held to pay the balance due.Y
installment land contract to prohibit a deficiency judgment. That statute is lim-
ited by its terms to foreclosure "sales of real property by mortgagees and/or trust-
ees." The court has not shown a willingness to expand the strict wording of the
statute, see Childers v. Parker's, Inc., 274 N.C. 256, 162 S.E.2d 481 (1968), and it
has held that the provision does not apply to unsecured notes given by the pur-
chaser in addition to cash and a purchase money deed of trust, Brown v. Owens,
251 N.C. 348, 111 S.E.2d 705 (1959). Cf. Realty Co. v. Trust Co., 296 N.C. 366, 250
S.E.2d 271 (1979); Real Estate Trust v. Debnam, 41 N.C. App. 256, 254 S.E.2d
638, petition for review allowed, 297 N.C. 698, 259 S.E.2d 295 (1979). Deficiency
judgments after foreclosure of installment land contracts were allowed prior to
passage of the anti-deficiency judgment statute. 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 36.
Bank v. Loughran, 122 N.C. 668, 30 S.E. 17 (1898).
71. Bank v. Loughran, 122 N.C. 668, 30 S.E. 17 (1898); McQueen v. Smith,
118 N.C. 569, 24 S.E. 412 (1896).
72. See Hairston v. Bescherer, 141 N.C. 205, 53 S.E. 845 (1906) (increase in
value from $100 at time of contract to $1000 at time of trial-purchaser allowed
to redeem by decree for specific performance). But cf. Syme v. Smith, 92 N.C. 338
(1885) ($596 paid on $750 purchase price plus many improvements not recover-
able by purchaser where vendor stands on the contract-but no attempt by pur-
chaser to redeem).
73. E.g., Crawford v. Allen, 189 N.C. 434, 127 S.E. 521 (1925).
74. Hicks v. King, 150 N.C. 370, 64 S.E. 125 (1909).
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B. Rights and Remedies of the Purchaser
Upon a breach by the vendor the purchaser may: (1) stand
upon the contract and sue at law for damages for its breach, or he
may seek specific performance in equity; or (2) treat the vendor's
breach as an abandonment and abandon the contract-thereby re-
scinding it-and recover what he has paid .7  The purchaser most
frequently finds himself in a defensive position, however, and be-
cause his actions upon the vendor's breach are not too dissimilar
from ordinary contract actions, the following material reviews pri-
marily his defensive remedies, including rescission.
The defaulting purchaser has several theories he can assert,
defensively or offensively,7 6 to recover his installments. When con-
tract principles are relied on and the vendor stands ready to per-
form, the purchaser must advance some theory which will allow
the court to circumvent or avoid the contract." He may claim no
contract was actually entered into,78 or that the contract made is
75. Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 155 S.E.2d 532 (1967). For remedies of
purchasers under installment land contracts see Lee, Remedies for Breach of the
Installment Land Contract, 19 U. MIAMI L. REv. 550 (1965); Spencer, Remedies
Available Under a Land Sale Contract, 3 WILLAmETTE L.J. 164 (1965); 3 AMERI-
cAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.66 et. seq. (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); Comment, Forfei-
ture: The Anomaly of the Land Sale Contract, 41 ALBANY L. REV. 71 (1977); An-
not., 6 A.L.R.2d 1401 (1949); Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 542 (1965). As to requirement for
election of remedies, see Lykes v. Grove, 201 N.C. 254, 159 S.E. 360 (1931). For a
suggestion that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1975), North Carolina's "Deceptive
Trade Practices Act," may be used as a defense to enforcement of forfeiture, see
Comment, Attacking the "Forfeiture as Liquidated Damages" Clause in North
Carolina Installment Land Sales Contracts as Equitable Mortgages, Penalty and
Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 370 (1976).
76. For treatment of remedies and rights of defaulting purchasers, see Lee,
Defaulting Purchaser's Right to Restitution Under the Installment Land Con-
tract, 20 U. MIAM L. REv. 1 (1965); Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to
the Restitution of Installments Paid, 40 YALE L.J. 1013 (1931); Note, Equitable
Relief Against Forfeitures in Land Sales, 32 YALE L.J. 65 (1922); Annot., 31
A.L.R.2d 8 (1953).
77. Generally, a purchaser in default cannot recover money paid on the con-
tract so long as the vendor is not in default and remains ready and willing to
perform the contract. See Improvement Co. v. Guthrie, 116 N.C. 381, 21 S.E. 952
(1895); 5 A. CORBIN CoNTRACTS § 1075 (1964); Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 8 (1958). Com-
pare Ford v. Stroud, 150 N.C. 362, 64 S.E. 1 (1909) (purchaser allowed to recover
payments and value of improvements less reasonable rents and profits upon repu-
diation by vendor of parol contract to convey).
78. Cf. Walker v. Weaver, 23 N.C. App. 654, 209 S.E.2d 537 (1974) (plaintiffs
alleged the contract became null and void upon failure of a condition).
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invalid or unenforceable. 79 He may recover upon proof that the
contract has been rescinded,80 either by mutual consent,81 by the
vendor,"' or by the purchaser where he has a right to rescind.8 A
purchaser may show that he has not abandoned the contract and
attempt to establish a waiver by the vendor." Some courts have
used the liquidated damages rule to characterize forfeiture as an
illegal penalty; 5 others have refused to enforce a forfeiture on the
grounds of simple justice,86 although the holding was articulated in
terms of rescission. Still other courts have held the contract to be
an equitable mortgages7 or a security arrangement which should be
treated as a mortgage in order to avoid forfeiture.88
When the vendor is also in default,89 the purchaser may re-
79. Improvement Co. v. Guthrie, 116 N.C. 381, 21 S.E. 952 (1895) (statute of
frauds objection); Garrow v. Brown, 60 N.C. (Win.) 595 (1864) (mental compe-
tency of buyer questioned).
80. Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Install-
ments Paid, 40 YALE L.J. 1013, 1019-20 (1931); 3 AMEmCAN LAW OF PROPERTY §
11.70 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); Note, Vendor-Vendee-Rescission of Executory
Contract for the Sale of Land, What Constitutes, 11 WASH. L. REv. 58 (1936).
81. Lewis v. Gay, 151 N.C. 168, 65 S.E. 907 (1909); Smith v. Stewart, 83 N.C.
406 (1880) (vendor entitled to fair rental less value of purchaser's improvements,
measured by enhanced value of land.)
82. Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 155 S.E.2d 532 (1967).
83. E.g., Knight v. Houghtalling, 85 N.C. 17 (1881) (fraud).
84. Douglass v. Brooks, 242 N.C. 178, 87 S.E.2d 258 (1955) (purchaser seek-
ing specific pefformance); Faw v. Whittington, 72 N.C. 321 (1875). See Annot., 68
A.L.R.2d 581 (1959).
85. E.g., Lytle v. Scottish Am. Mortgage Co., 122 Ga. 458, 50 S.E. 402 (1905);
Graves v. Cupie, 75 Idaho 451, 272 P.2d 1020 (1954). Cases are collected in An-
not., 6 A.L.R.2d 1401 (1949). Cf. Annot., 48 A.L.R. 899 (1927).
86. E.g., Pierce v. Staub, 78 Conn. 459, 62 A. 760 (1906) (landmark case);
Williams v. DeLay, 395 P.2d 839 (Alas. 1964).
87. E.g., Helmerick v. Simpson, 235 Ark. 280, 359 S.W.2d 447 (1962). Cf.
Hardy v. Neville, 261 N.C. 454, 135 S.E.2d 48 (1964) (holding a transaction in-
volving contract of purchase and sale to be an equitable mortgage, where the land
belonged to the purchaser initially and was deeded to the vendor for an advance
of money, with an installment contract for repurchase). See generally 59 C.J.S.
Mortgages § 14(f) (1949); Annot., 77 A.L.R. 270, 272 (1932).
88. See H & L Land Co. v. Warner, 258 So. 2d 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972),
noted in 26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 855 (1972); Nelson v. Robinson, 184 Kan. 340, 336
P.2d 415 (1959); Rothenberg v. Follman, 19 Mich. App. 383, 172 N.W.2d 845
(1969); 1 G. GLENN, MORTGAGES, § 15.1 (1943); Lee, Remedies for Breach of the
Installment Land Contract, 19 U. MIAMI L. REv. 550, 558 (1965); Annot., 77
A.L.R. 270 (1932).
89. Williston's opinion is that if a defect in title cannot be removed the pur-
chaser has an excuse, but if an encumbrance can be removed, the question is one
[Vol. 3:29
20
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol3/iss1/2
INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACTS
cover his payments 0 or sue for specific performance."' But when a
defaulting purchaser brings an action to recover his payments and
the vendor shows that he, the vendor, is still upholding the con-
tract, the North Carolina Supreme Court has refused, without
mention of mortgage principles, to allow a return of installments."
Such cases appear to be based on the idea that the enforceability
of contracts is of overriding importance." Each time, the court has
been careful to note that the defendant-vendor was standing on
the contract and came into court offering to perform."
of degree and of probability of prospective failure. 6 S. WuLISTON, CONTRACTS §
879 (3d ed. 1962). See Note, Vendor and Purchaser-Mortgaging of Land by
Vendor-Effect on Vendee's Duty to Continue Installment Payments, 33 MICH.
L. REv. 461 (1935); Note, Vendor-Purchaser -Prospective Inability of Vendor to
Convey, 31 MICH. L. Rzv. 1002 (1933); Note, Vendor and Pur-
chaser-Anticipatory Rescission of Land Contract by Vendee, 6 Wis. L. REv. 255
(1931).
90. Knowles v. Wallace, 210 N.C. 603, 188 S.E. 195 (1936); Adams v. Beasley,
174 N.C. 118, 93 S.E. 454 (1917).
91. North Carolina has decreed specific performance in favor of the pur-
chaser even where the vendor had no title to convey. Love v. Camp, 41 N.C. (6
Ired.) 209 (1849) (defendant did not adequately show what attempt he had made
to acquire title). See Welborn v. Sechrist, 88 N.C. 287 (1883) ("compel [vendor] to
make sufficient efforts to undo what he has done"). But if the vendor, after rea-
sonable efforts to obtain title, cannot do so, he has a defense. Swepson v. Johnson,
84 N.C. 449 (1881), citing Love v. Cobb, 63 N.C. 324 (1869) (wherein purchaser
knew at time of contract that vendor had no title). If the vendor has only part of
the lands contracted to be conveyed, he can be required to convey that portion,
with an abatement in the purchase price. Swepson v. Johnson, supra.; accord,
Goldstein v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 241 N.C. 583, 86 S.E.2d 84 (1955) (ear-
nest money contract); Flowe v. Hartwick, 167 N.C. 448, 83 S.E. 841 (1914) (same).
See Note, Vendor and Purchaser: Vendee's Right to Partial Specific Perform-
ance With Abatement Upon Failure of Vendor's Title, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 495
(1971); Note, 40 MINN. L. RPv. 85 (1956); Note, Specific Performance-Failure of
Vendor's Title, 34MXcH. L. REv. 890 (1936); Note, 10 TEx. L. REv. 114 (1932).
92. Improvement Co. v. Guthrie, 116 N.C. 381, 21 S.E. 952 (1895); Syme v.
Smith, 92 N.C. 338 (1885); Green v. N.C.R.R., 77 N.C. 95 (1877); Foust v.
Shoffner, 62 N.C. (Phil. Eq.) 242 (1867).
93. The contract basis for the court's consideration of the installment land
contract was emphasized in Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 69, 155 S.E.2d 532,
538 (1967), where the court concluded that, "since plaintiffs brought this action to
recover payments they had made, their theory necessarily is that defendants had
rescinded the contract." Mortgage principles as applied to installment land con-
tracts were discussed at length but the court made no allusion to the possibility of
treating the contract as a mortgage in order to avoid a forfeiture and to allow the
plaintiff-purchasers a chance to recover their equity after a foreclosure sale.
94. Of course, refusal to order a return of all or a portion of purchaser's pay-
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On the other hand, when the plaintiff-purchaser comes into
court after his default asking for specific performance of the con-
tract, rather than for recovery of his payments, the court has no
difficulty circumventing the vendor's right to forfeiture under the
contract.95 The vendor may be found to have contributed to the
delay" or to have failed to take proper steps to meet the require-
ments for forfeiture.91 Absent an express provision in the contract
making time of the essence,98 the court generally utilizes the mort-
gage analogy, stating that equity will not countenance a forfeiture
for mere delay.9 ' Implicit in the cases as a whole, and expressly
discussed in some, 00 is the general rule of equity that the court
will consider all the circumstances of the case, particularly the fair-
ness of the agreement and justness of the proposed remedy. Of
special significance is that many of these cases discuss mortgage
principles and base the results in large part on equitable doctrines
drawn from mortgage precedents.' 01
When the vendor exercises any of his remedies for terminating
the contract, the purchaser is not entitled to recover reimburse-
ment for the improvements which he may have constructed on the
property, under ordinary circumstances. 02 However, if the vendor
is unable to perform, the purchaser is entitled to compensation for
the improvements made in reliance on the contract to the extent
ments is not the same as sanctioning a forfeiture of those payments. The posture
of these cases has not squarely presented the forfeiture issue. See, e.g., Syme v.
Smith, 92 N.C. 338 (1885); Green v. N.C.R.R., 77 N.C. 95 (1877).
95. E.g., Ward v. Union Bond & Trust Co., 243 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1957)
(wilfully defaulting vendee), criticized in Note, Full Performance For Defaulting
Vendee-A Questionable Step in Contract Law, 10 STANFORD L. REv. 355 (1958);
MacFadden v. Walker, 5 Cal. 3d 809, 488 P.2d 1353, 97 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1971)
(wilfully defaulting vendee), noted in 5 LOYOLA L. REV. 435 (1972).
96. Douglass v. Brooks, 242 N.C. 178, 87 S.E.2d 258 (1955); Faw v. Whitting-
ton, 72 N.C. 321 (1875); Falls v. Carpenter, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq) 237 (1835).
But see Holden v. Purefoy, 108 N.C. 163, 12 S.E. 848 (1891); Francis v. Love, 56
N.C. (3 Jones Eq.) 321 (1857).
97. Hairston v. Bescherer, 141 N.C. 205, 53 S.E. 845 (1906); White v. Butch-
er, 59 N.C. (6 Jones Eq.) 231 (1861); Scarlett v. Hunter, 56 N.C. (3 Jones Eq.) 84
(1856).
98. See, e.g., Douglass v. Brooks, 242 N.C. 178, 37 S.E.2d 258 (1955).
99. Eig., Hairston v. Bescherer, 141 N.C. 205, 53 S.E. 845 (1906).
100. E.g., Douglass v. Brooks, 242 N.C. 178, 87 S.E.2d 258 (1955).
101. E.g., Hairston v. Bescherer, 141 N.C. 205, 53 S.E. 845 (1906); Scarlett v.
Hunter, 56 N.C. (3 Jones Eq.) 84 (1856).
102. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.79 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
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that they improve the value of the property.'03 Even when the pur-
chaser defaults, a showing by purchaser of his equities might in-
duce the court to make proper allowance for the improvements,
either in the form of ordering reimbursement as a prerequisite to a
forfeiture, or providing for reimbursement from the proceeds of a
foreclosure sale.'"
III. INCIDENTS OF THE INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACT
Cases which concern default remedies and those which define
incidents of installment land contracts support the proposition
that the security relationship of the parties is that of mortgagor-
mortgagee. In large part, the rights of the parties to an installment
land contract are identical to those of mortgagor and mortgagee.
Many states '0 5 apply the doctrine of equitable conversion' 6 to
the vendor-purchaser relationship as a means of achieving an equi-
table result. Pomeroy described the circumstances giving rise to
equitable conversion:
A contract of sale, if all the terms are agreed upon, also operates
as a conversion of the property, the vendor becoming a trustee of
the estate for the purchaser, and the purchaser a trustee of the
purchase-money for the vendor. In order to work a conversion,
the contract must be valid and binding, free from equitable im-
perfections, and such as a court of equity will specifically enforce
against an unwilling purchaser.' 7
Equitable conversion places equitable title to the land in the pur-
103. Knowles v. Wallace, 210 N.C. 603, 188 S.E. 195 (1936). See Carnahan,
The Kentucky Rule of Damages for Breach of Executory Contracts to Convey
Realty, 20 Ky. L. REv. 304 (1932).
104. Supra note 102.
105. Lewis & Reeves, How the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion Affects
Land Sale Contract Forfeitures, 3 RzAL EsT. L.J. 249 (1974).
106. Whether "this heaven of juristic conceptions" is an unnecessary
fiction, as has been ably argued in Stone, Equitable Conversion by Con-
tract, 13 COLUM. L. Rav. 369 (1913), or whether it does in fact express an
underlying principle in the decisions, it at least furnishes a convenient
label to attach to cases of several related groups which, taken together,
occupy an important corner in the law of real property.
3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.22 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
107. 4 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JUISPRUDENCE § 1161 (5th ed. 1941). Why Pome-
roy limited enforcement of specific performance as against a purchaser has been
questioned. Certainly specific performance against the vendor should give rise to
equitable conversion. Lee, The Interests Created by the Installment Land Con-
tract, 19 U. MIAMI L. REV. 367, 370 (1965).
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chaser and equitable right to the purchase price in the vendor.' 8
The similarity to the principles applied to mortgages in a "title
theory" state is apparent. Although the vendor-mortgagee may
hold legal title to the premises, because of his equitable title the
purchaser-mortgagor has certain rights which would customarily
accrue to one holding legal title.109 Absent controlling contract pro-
visions, the doctrine of equitable conversion has been applied to
resolve nearly all disputes concerning rights to the property as be-
tween vendor and purchaser, and as between vendor, purchaser
and third parties. Rarely has North Carolina recognized and ap-
plied the doctrine of equitable conversion.110 Nevertheless, the re-
sults in most of the cases dealing with the problems mentioned in
this section are consistent with the results reached by courts ex-
pressly finding an equitable conversion. A careful consideration of
this doctrine's application may prove helpful in many situations.
A. Assignment
Absent restrictive provisions, the interests of both vendor and
purchaser in an installment land contract are assignable.1 As in
the mortgage situation, the purchaser's assignee 12 can complete
108. It has been ably argued that because there is no right to specific per-
formance prior to the payment of the last installment there is no equitable con-
version until that time. Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919: Equity, 33
HAnv. L. Rav. 929, 950 (1920). It has been argued with equal certitude that equi-
table conversion occurs at the moment the contract is executed. Simpson, Legisla-
tive Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract: I, 44 YALE L.J.
754, 774 (1935). Langdell evidently approved of the latter view. Langdell, Equita-
ble Conversion III, 18 HAav. L. Rav. 245, 268-69 (1905). Simpson's view, that
there is a mutually specifically enforceable contract from the beginning, subject to
a condition of prompt payment of future installments, is preferable. The parties
are clothed with equitable rights at the creation of the contract arising from the
nature of the transaction, in essence a security arrangement-rights which can be
protected by a court of equity even in the face of the "condition precedent" lan-
guage of the contract.
109. See 7 S. Wn.LsrON, CONTm1rS § 930 (3d ed. 1963); H. MCCLINTOCK,
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 106 (2d ed. 1948); D. DoBB, REMEDIES § 2.3 at 40-41
(1973); 8A G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §§ 4447, 4448 (1963).
110. Infra notes 125 and 126.
111. See 3 AMacAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.36 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); God-
dard, Non-Assignment Provisions in Land Contracts, 31 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1932).
112. The purchaser would still be bound in such a situation of course, even in
the event of an assumption by the assignee. But between the purchaser and the
assignee, the former would stand in the shoes of a surety, under the mortgage
analogy. Fed. Land Bank of Columbia v. Whitehurst, 203 N.C. 302, 165 S.E. 793
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the contract and insist on conveyance to himself,11 s but the vendor
cannot compel performance by the purchaser's assignee unless the
assignee has "assumed" the obligation. 1 4 Likewise, the vendor can
assign his interest as long as he protects the purchaser's interest,11 5
that is, the purchaser will have the right to compel conveyance by
the vendor's assignee.' An assignment of the note by the vendor
should also act as an assignment of the underlying security.1 1 7
(1932). Where there are subsequent assignments with assumptions and the vendor
takes an assignment from the last assignee and releases him, vendor may be pre-
cluded by surety principles from an action against an intermediate assignee. Mc-
Curdy v. Van Os, 290 Mich. 492, 287 N.W. 890 (1939), noted in 8 DuKz BAR A.J.
60 (1940). A third party beneficiary claim might, however, afford a basis for relief.
113. Shaver v. Shoemaker, 62 N.C. (Phil. Eq.) 327 (1868). See Anderson v.
Am. Suburban Corp., 155 N.C. 13, 71 S.E. 221 (1911).
114. Morrison v. Chambers, 122 N.C. 689, 30 S.E. 141 (1898).
115. See Derr v. Dellinger, 75 N.C. (Hargrove) 300 (1876); Taylor v. Kelly, 56
N.C. (3 Jones Eq.) 240 (1857).
116. Whether in this instance the vendor may compel the purchaser to accept
a deed from the vendor's assignee or grantee is another question. The covenants
of seisin and right to convey are personal and do not run with the land. A grantee
can only recover for breach of these covenants from his grantor. Lockhart v.
Parker, 189 N.C. 138, 126 S.E. 313 (1925). Therefore, if the purchaser is required
to accept a deed from one other than the vendor, the purchaser does not receive
what he bargained for. A duty which is the giving of a personal covenant or prom-
ise is not delegable and it is therefore to be questioned whether the vendor can by
assignment substitute the covenant of the assignee, and his liability, for that of
vendor. See Clark, Installment Land Contracts in South Dakota, 6 S.D. L. Rv.
248, 278 (1961).
117. Morrison v. Chambers, 122 N.C. 689, 30 S.E. 141 (1898). Such an assign-
ment also carries with it the security interest or lien of the vendor under the
installment land contract. Hadley v. Nash, 69 N.C. 162 (1873). Assignment of the
debt (as opposed to the mortgage itself) by a mortgagee carries with it the secur-
ity of the mortgage. See H. J. Weil & Bros. v. Davis, 168 N.C. 298, 84 S.E. 395
(1915), allowing the assignee upon default by the mortgagor to foreclose by action.
The assignee of a vendor should have the same right, if the contract provides for
foreclosure. Battery Park Bank v. Loughran, 122 N.C. 668, 30 S.E. 17 (1898).
If the contract does not so provide, is there a "lien" which the assignee of
vendor's notes can enforce to secure payment? Womble v. Battle, 38 N.C. (3 Ire.
Eq.) 182 (1844) established that North Carolina does not recognize a vendor's lien
in the absence of a mortgage or deed of trust. But in all of the cases following that
holding the vendor had parted with title. Where title is retained that dic-
tum-addressed to the classic equitable vendor's lien and reasserted in Brannock
v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 73, 155 S.E.2d 532 541 (1967)-does not apply. By his
reservation of title, the vendor has a lien as security for purchaser's performance,
9 G. THOMPSON, R&& PROPRRTY § 4719 (repl. ed. 1958), on the property to the
extent of any unpaid balance and his right to foreclose by action the purchaser's
equitable title has been recognized and enforced in this state. Ellis v. Hussey, 66
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B. Death of Either Party
When a vendor dies intestate during the contract period, title
descends to his heirs under the provisions of North Carolina's in-
testacy statutes. 118 The classification of decedent's interest as real
or personal has no effect upon this passing of title. Ordinarily, the
persons taking title under the statute would be required to execute
the deed, but North Carolina gives the personal representative that
authority by statute."'1
If the vendor-decedent dies testate, however, other problems
arise. Whether his interest is classified as real or personal may de-
termine whether it passes under a general devise of real property
or whether it passes under the residuary clause and is therefore
first liable for debts. If testator makes a specific devise of the prop-
erty described in the contract, is the devisee entitled to the pro-
ceeds from the contract, or is the devise extinguished by ademp-
tion and the proceeds available for debts as a part of the residuary
estate? 120 If the court determines that an equitable conversion has
occurred, the testate's property will be considered personalty, but
courts tend to find the devisee under a specific devise entitled to
the proceeds, especially when the will was executed after the in-
stallment land contract."'2
Upon the death of the purchaser pending the final payment of
the contract, similar problems arise. Again, under North Carolina
law, the characterization of the intestate purchaser's interest as
real or personal property has no effect upon distribution. But when
N.C. 501 (1872); Jones v. Boyd, 80 N.C. 258 (1879) (lack of acceleration clause
and impediment). See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R. 270 (1932); Note, Forfeiture by
Vendor after Assignment of Notes, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 835 (1929); 3 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 11.74 (A.J. CASNER ed. 1952).
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 29 (1976).
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. 28A-17-9 (1976). See Grubb v. Lookabill, 100 N.C. 267,
6 S.E. 390 (1888) (vendor's heirs necessary parties to an action to enforce the
contract).
120. Compare Chambers v. Kerns, 59 N.C. (6 Jones Eq.) 280 (1862) (specific
devise of lands in will held adeemed where land sold under bond for title after
execution of will and residuary provided for "money arising from the collection of
my bonds, notes and accounts") with Rue v. Connell, 148 N.C. 302, 62 S.E. 306
(1908) (where testator's plantation was the subject of contract unsuccessfully con-
tested by a third person during his life, but successfully enforced after his death,
there was no ademption and proceeds passed to devisee because testator died in
possession believing himself to be the owner). Cf. Green v. Green, 231 N.C. 707,
58 S.E.2d 722 (1950).
121. See 3 AMEICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.26 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
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the purchaser dies testate, can his devisee of the property take
it,122 or is the contract right to be treated as personalty which does
not pass under a devise of realty? Under equitable conversion
principles, the interest of purchaser-testator would be considered
realty in order to accomplish the result probably intended by tes-
tator-that his interest pass as realty under his will.'23
If real property is owned by the entireties and the owners con-
tract to sell it but one dies prior to the time for conveyance, two
questions arise: (1) is the survivor entitled to the proceeds, and (2)
can the survivor alone convey title to the purchaser? No North
Carolina authority speaks directly to these questions, but the
courts of this state would probably answer both questions nega-
tively. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has applied the doc-
trine of equitable conversion in executory contract situations in-
volving death 2 4 and involving entirety property,25 but never in a
situation combining these circumstances. Under the equitable con-
version doctrine, the proceeds from an executed sale of entireties
property are personalty. North Carolina does not recognize ten-
ancy by the entireties in personal property.'" Rights of a husband
and wife in a purchase money .mortgage and the notes secured by
it, although securing the sale of property formerly owned by the
entireties, are held by husband and wife as tenants in common and
are personalty. The survivor is not entitled to the whole when a
balance remains due at the death of the other spouse. 1 By a par-
122. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. 28A-15-3 (1976), the devisee of encumbered
property is not entitled to have the encumbrance exonerated by the residuary
estate. See H. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 108 (2d ed. 1948).
123. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.27 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
124. Scott v. Jordan, 235 N.C. 244, 69 S.E.2d 557 (1952).
125. Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N.C. 396, 42 S.E.2d 468 (1947) (proceeds of sale are
personalty and held in common); N.C. State Highway Comm. v. Meyers, 270 N.C.
258, 154 S.E.2d 87 (1967) (proceeds not personalty in condemnation); Perry v.
Jolly, 259 N.C. 306, 130 S.E.2d 654 (1963) (same in involuntary sale).
126. Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 124 S.E.2d 566 (1924).
127. Turlington v. Lucas, 186 N.C. 282, 119 S.E. 366 (1923). Cf. Shores v.
Rabon, 251 N.C. 790, 112 S.E.2d 556, (1960); Dozier v. Leary, 196 N.C. 12, 144
S.E. 368 (1928) (not a purchase money mortgage or note). Where husband and
wife sold real property owned by them as tenants by the entireties and took back
a purchase money note and mortgage, after which husband died, and the widow
brought an action to obtain the balance of the proceeds not collected and spent
by the husband prior to his death, it was said that the mortgage, being made to
both of them, was only to them as trustees of the legal title to secure the debt.
Isley v. Sellers, 153 N.C. 374, 69 S.E 279 (1910). But cf. Forsyth County v. Pelm-
mons, 2 N.C. App. 373, 375 163 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1968) ("The land is still owned by
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ity of reasoning the result should be the same for proceeds under
an installment land contract, based on either the rationale of equi-
table conversion 1s or mortgage analogy. 129The answer to the second question may be of more conse-
quence because title is involved. The statute allowing a personal
representative to execute a deed does not make an exception for
the facts in the question posed,130 nor have any of the cases de-
cided under that statute considered this situation. Logically, the
answer to both questions would have to be the same. If the effect
of the contract is to sever a tenancy by the entireties, thereby leav-
ing no rights of survivorship in the proceeds, it should also sever
the tenancy as to survivorship in the bare legal title.
C. Dower and Curtesy
At common law a widow had no dower interest in an equitable
estate, " ' although the rule as to curtesy was otherwise." ' North
Carolina, under its statute, " did award dower to the purchaser's
the husband and wife in exactly the same manner as before the fire"-fire insur-
ance proceeds considered personalty and therefore held in common).
128. If the contract is specifically enforceable, the proceeds and the vendor's
interest in them, under equitable converison, are personalty. The conversion oc-
curs upon execution of the contract, thereby severing the tenancy by the entirety.
Panushka v. Panushka, 221 Or. 145, 349 P.2d 450 (1960).noted in 36 N.D. L. REv.
203 (1960). See 3 AMEmCA LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.28A (Supp. 1977); Comment,
Equitable Conversion by Contract, 7 ARK. L. REV. 45, 55 (1952).
129. See Comment, Survivorship After Joint Tenants Execute Contract for
Sale of Land, 24 Mo. L. REV. 108 (1959); Note, 41 CORNRLL L.Q. 154 (1955); Note,
34 NE. L. REV. 501 (1955); Note, 55 MICH. L. REV. 1194 (1957); Note, 42 IowA L.
REV. 646 (1957). 4 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 1792 (repl. 1979). No doubt
the same result could be reached on the basis of impairment of one or more of the
five unities of tenancy by the entirety. See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
"185.
It hardly needs stating that the result forecast in the text would rarely, if
ever, coincide with the intentions or expectations of the parties. Over-extension of
the fictions developed to justify the creation of a tenancy by the entirety to ra-
tionalize its termination is only one basis for the increasing criticism of the en-
tirety property doctrine in this state. See Note, 58 N.C. L. REv. 997 (1980).
130. N.C. GEN. STAT. 28A-17-9 (1976) provides that where a decedent has
contracted to convey real property the personal representative may execute and
deliver a deed for the property.
131. 1 E. COKE, COMMENTRIuES UPON LITrLETON § 31.(1st Am. ed. 1853).
132. Note, Real Property-Dower in Equitable Interests-Executory Con-
tracts for Purchase of Land, 38 YALE L.J. 996 (1929). Cf. Sentill v. Robeson, 55
N.C. (2 Jones Eq.) 509 (1856).
133. Dower:. 1827 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 46 (most recently codified as N.C.
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widow to the extent of his interest under an installment land con-
tract,13 4 particularly when the purchase price had been paid in full
but the deed not yet delivered. 135 Dower and curtesy were abol-
ished in North Carolina in 19591 and replaced by the so-called
statutory dower substitute statute.13 7 The former dower statute ex-
pressly referred to "equitable estates in lands" but G.S. 29-301' 8 by
its terms includes only a share of "all the real estate of which the
deceased spouse was seized and possessed of an estate of inheri-
tance." The equitable interest held by a deceased purchaser under
an installment land contract is not seisen of an inheritable estate
as conceived at common law; nevertheless, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court has said that ". . G.S. 29-30 preserves to surviving
spouse the benefits of the former rights of dower and curtesy."'"
There is also precedent in this State for exonerating the surviving
spouse from the personal estate of the decedent" 0 to the extent of
the equitable marital interest, and the statutory dower substitute
statute does not expressly alter or abolish this exoneration."
At common law and under the old and new marital interest
statutes the otherwise entitled surviving spouse of a deceased ven-
dor would be entitled to any unwaived marital interest in the ven-
dor's land subject to an installment land contract. 4 2
GEN. STAT. § 30-5 (1950), repealed by 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 879, § 14).
Curtesy: 1871-2 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 193, § 30 (most recently codified as N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 52-16 (1950), repealed 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 878, § 1).
134. Bunting v. Foy, 66 N.C. 193 (1872); Thompson v. Thompson, 46 N.C. (1
Jones) 430 (1854).
135. Howell v. Parker, 136 N.C. 373, 48 S.E. 762 (1904); Love v. McClure, 99
N.C. 290, 6 S.E. 247 (1888). See Annot., 66 A.L.R. 65 (1930).
136. 1959 N.C. Seass. Laws ch. 879, § 14.
137. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (1976).
138. Id.
139. Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 30, 143 S.E.2d 300, 308 (1965).
140. Love v. McClure, 99 N.C. 290, 6 S.E. 247 (1888); Caroon v. Cooper, 63
N.C. 386 (1869); Klutt v. Klutts, 58 N.C. (5 Jones Eq.) 80 (1859). The weight of
authority is contra., 3 AmmcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 1128 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30(g) (1976) provides that the life estate taken by
election under that section shall not be subject to payments of debts due from the
estate of the deceased spouse, except those debts secured by such property by a
mortgage or deed of trust.
142. See 3 AMERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.28 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); An-
not., 8 A.L.R.3d 569 (1966).
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D. Possession and Possessory Actions
Under an installment land contract the land remains the ven-
dor's at law and he has a right to possession and to the rents and
profits until the purchase money has been paid. 143 The purchaser's
payment of the majority of the purchase price has no effect upon
the purchaser's right to possession.1 44 However, the purchaser may
be given the right to possession prior to the conveyance of title,
either by the terms of the contract or by necessary implication.'4 5
"Like a mortgagor, a vendee who, by agreement with his vendor, is
in. possession of the property under an executory contract of
purchase and sale cannot be deprived thereof as long as he is not
in default in the performance of his contract. 1 4 Both types of
contracts allow the party in possession to retain rents and profits
absent some other arrangement,1 47 and if the mortgagee1 8 or ven-
dor '4 9 goes into possession he will have to account for rents and
profits on demand.
Like a mortgagor,150 one holding equitable title under an exec-
utory land contract can maintain either an action in ejectment or
some other possessory action.151 A purchaser in possession may be
liable to the vendor for depreciation or destruction1 52 caused by
the former, or for waste or use which impairs the security.153
Where the vendor retains possession he may be held liable to the
purchaser for waste and repairs.'"
143. Allen v. Taylor, 96 N.C. 37, 1 S.E. 462 (1887).
144. Butner v. Chaffin, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 497 (1868).
145. Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 155 S.E.2d 532 (1967); Annot. 28
A.L.R. 1069 (1924).
146. Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 71, 155 S.E.2d 532, 539 (1967).
147. Id., (land contract); Kistler v. Wilmington Dev. Co., 205 N.C. 755, 172
S.E. 413 (1934) (mortgage).
148. Anderson v. Moore, 233 N.C. 299, 63 S.E.2d 641 (1951).
149. Butner v. Chaffin, 61 N.C. (Phil Law) 497 (1868).
150. Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co., 131 N.C. 536, 42 S.E. 983 (1902).
151. Skinner v. Terry, 134 N.C. 305, 46 S.E. 517 (1904).
152. Supra note 146.
153. H. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 112 (2d ed. 1948). The vendor may not be
able to enjoin the purchaser's cutting of timber unless it can be shown the ven-
dor's security is thereby impaired. Small v. Slocumb, 112 Ga. 279, 37 S.E. 481
(1900).
154. Crawley v. Timberlake, 37 N.C. (2 Ired. Eq.) 460 (1843); Note, The Ven-
dor's Liability for Permissive Waste, 48 HA.v. L. Rav. 821 (1935). Compare
Gregg v. Williamson, 246 N.C. 356, 98 S.E.2d 481 (1957) (mortgagee in possession
after default charged with repair).
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E. Creditor's Rights
Questions of creditor's rights and priorities have been the sub-
ject of numerous articles. 55 Courts in various states other than
North Carolina have utilized equitable conversion to provide a ra-
tional basis for a workable solution to the complex problems aris-
ing in this area. Even if the interest of the vendor or purchaser is
found subject to judgment liens 56 or other rights, reaching the in-
terest itself for collection presents even more complicated
problems.
Although in some states the interest of a vendor is subject to
155. E.g., Lacy, Creditors of Land Contract Vendors, 24 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 645 (1973); Comment, Are the Interests of Vendor and Purchaser Amenable
to Creditors in Illinois, 1955 U. ILL. L.F. 754; Note, Rights of a Judgment Credi-
tor Against a Vendor or Vendee Following an Executory Contract for the Sale of
Land, 43 IOWA L. REV. 366 (1958); Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 727 (1948).
156. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-234 (Supp. 1979), provides, in part:
... [A judgment docketed] is a lien on the real property in the
county where the same is docketed of every person against whom any
such judgment is rendered, and which he has at the time of the docket-
ing thereof in the county in which such real property is situated, or
which he acquires at any time thereafter, for 10 years from the date of
the rendition of the judgment.
Broad dictum statements are to be found to the effect that this statute will be
construed to extend to legal and equitable estates, even though the interest held
by the judgment debtor cannot be subjected to levy and sale. See Mayo v. Staton,
137 N.C. 670, 50 S.E. 331 (1905) (interest of debtor-trustor under deed of trust);
Hoppock v. Shober, 69 N.C. 153 (1873); McKeithan v. Walker, 66 N.C. 95 (1872)
(interest of debtor-trustor under deed of trust). But see Moore v. Byers, 65 N.C.
240 (1871) (the vendor's interest under an installment land contract was not sub-
ject to a lien because enforcement of the lien would prevent his conveying legal
title to the purchaser, and that therefore the judgment creditors had no priority
as to the proceeds of the notes payable under the installment land contract). See
Hadley v. Nash 69 N.C. 162 (1873). Compare Jackson v. Thompson, 214 N.C. 539,
200 S.E. 16 (1938) (no judgment lien against resulting trustee). Whether a dock-
eted judgment becomes a lien on a purchaser's interest under an installment land
contract so that the judgment creditor acquires priority is apparently an open
question in North Carolina. Compare Trimble v. Hunter, 104 N.C. 129, 10 S.E.
291 (1889) (equity of redemption is lienable). Cf. Taylor v. Capehart 128 N.C. 292,
38 S.E. 890 (1901) (if judgment against purchaser does constitute a lien, it is not
superior to rights of vendor where vendor forecloses the contract under power of
sale, and through conveyance from the purchaser at the sale, reacquires the prop-
erty). Whether the purchaser must begin to make his payments to the vendor's
judgment creditor upon docketing of the judgment or upon actual notice or at
some other time does not present a problem if the judgment is not a lien. See
Note, 43 IA. L. REV. 366 (1958).
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execution to the extent of the unpaid purchase money,'57 the
North Carolina Supreme Court has held that bare legal title is not
vendible and if sold at execution carries with it no interest in the
purchase money.'58 However, G.S. § 1-315,60 which enumerates
property liable to sale under execution, was amended in 1961160 to
include "choses in action represented by any interest in property,
together with the security interest in property."'' This provision
changes the old rule and, to the extent the purchase price remains
unpaid, the vendor's interest should now be subject to levy and
execution in North Carolina by a levy on the vendor's contract. 6
Unlike the mortgagor's equity of redemption,163 the interest of
a purchaser under an installment land contract has been held not
subject to levy and sale by creditors, 6' at least not until the
purchase money is fully paid 65 or the deed executed.'66
157. H. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 116 (2d ed. 1948); 30 AM. JUR. 2D Executions
§ 166 (1967).
158. Tally v. Reed, 74 N.C. 463 (1876), affirming on rehearing Tally v. Reed,
72 N.C. 336 (1875) overruling Tomlinson v. Blackburn, 37 N.C. (2 Ired. Eq.) 509
(1843) and Linch v. Gibson, 4 N.C. 676 (1817); Folger v. Bowles, 72 N.C. 603
(1875); Blackmen v. Phillips, 67 N.C. 340 (1872). Cf. Willis v. Anderson, 188 N.C.
479, 124 S.E. 834 (1924). Compare Stevens v. Turlington, 186 N.C. 191, 119 S.E.
210 (1923) (mortgagee's interest not subject to execution). See infra note 159.
159. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-315 (1969).
160. 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 81. The cases cited in note 157, supra. were
decided under the Act of 1812, 1812 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 380, §§ 1, 2.
161. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-315(a)(6) (1969).
162. Although the statute is in derogation of the common law which allowed
no execution upon choses in action, see Grocery Co. v. Newman, 184 N.C. 370, 114
S.E. 535 (1922), even under a strict construction, a chose in action should include
the contract, even without promissory notes evidencing the indebtedness. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-57 (1969), and the annotations thereto. The "indispensable
instruments" requirement was apparently added by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-315(a)
5, 6 (1969) to preclude executions on choses in action arising on, e.g., a claim for
wages and not based upon a writing "indispensable" to the claim. "Instruments",
it would seem, should not be restricted to negotiable instruments.
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-315(a)(3) (1969): "Equitable and legal rights of re-
demption in real property pledged or mortgaged by him, or transferred to a trus-
tee for security by him" are property of the judgment debtor which may be levied
on and sold under execution. Mayo v. Staton, 137 N.C. 670, 50 S.E. 331 (1905).
164. May v. Getty, 140 N.C. 310, 55 S.E. 75 (1905); Ledbetter v. Anderson, 62
N.C. (Phil. Eq.) 323 (1868).
165. Hinsdale v. Thorton, 75 N.C. (Hargrove) 381 (1876) (semble). At that
time the "trust" relation with the vendor becomes an unmixed trust and is fully
satisfied, and the purchaser acquires an "estate in equity" which is subject to
execution.
166. Execution on equitable interests was not allowed at the common law,
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F. Risk of Loss
Who should bear the risk of loss of the property subject to an
installment land contract is a question which has provoked
volumes of commentary and appellate decisions. North Carolina
became one of the first state to adopt the Uniform Vendor and
Purchaser Risk Act 1 7 which settled such controversies in this state
by placing the risk of loss of the one in possession.
When a loss is insured by the vendor-beneficiary, the pur-
chaser's entitlement to any of the insurance money or a credit to-
ward the purchase price for the amount of the recovery is a fre-
quently litigated question.6 8 North Carolina answers this question
according to the English rule: a contract of insurance is a personal
contract of indemnity and the benefit does not pass to the pur-
chaser.16' This view seems neither to recognize the economic reali-
ties of the situation nor to consider the usual expectations of the
parties to the installment land contract,77 and thus represents an-
other area in which the draftsman must exercise care to protect
the purchaser's contemplated interest.
Payne v. Hubbard, 4 N.C. (Term) 195 (1815), hence the necessity for the statu-
tory remedy, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-315(a)(3) (1969). By its terms, supra note 163,
the statute does not include a purchaser's interest under an installment land con-
tract and it is not likely to be so broadly construed. See Hardware Co. v. Lewis,
173 N.C. 290, 92 S.E. 13 (1917); cf. Evins v. Sandefur Julian Co., 81 Ark. 70, 98
S.W. 677 (1906), citing Hardy v. Heard, 15 Ark. 184 (1854) (construing a slightly
broader statute). Query whether the 1961 amendment, 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws § 81,
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-315(a) 5, 6 (1969)), changes the rule against exe-
cution on a purchaser's interest. That amendment added to property subject to
execution "(5) Choses in action represented by instruments which are indispensa-
ble to the chose in action. (6) Choses in action represented by indispensable in-
struments, which are secured by any interest in property, together with the secur-
ity interest in property."
167. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 39-37, -38, -39 (1976) (adopted 1959). For earlier law,
see Poole v. Scott, 228 N.C. 464, 46 S.E.2d 145 (1948) (earnest money contract);
Warehouse Co. v. Warehouse Corp., 185 N.C. 518, 117 S.E. 625 (1923) (same-risk
on vendee).
168. Note, 22 ALBANY L. REv. 174 (1958); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 1402 (1959).
169. Poole v. Scott, 228 N.C. 464, S.E.2d 145 (1958) (semble). See Insurance
Co. v. Tire Co., 286 N.C. 282, 210 S.E.2d 414 (1974); Green v. Insurance Co., 233
N.C. 321, 64 S.E.2d 162 (1951); Insurance Co. v. Reid, 171 N.C. 513, 88 S.E. 779
(1916). Compare Insurance Co. v. Assurance Co., 259 N.C. 485, 131 S.E.2d 36
(1963).
170. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.31 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); R.
KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 4.3(e) (1971); Clark, Installment Land Contracts in
South Dakota, 6 S.D. L. REv. 248, 288 (1961).
1981]
33
Narron: Installment Land Contracts in North Carolina
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1981
62 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:29
G. Miscellaneous
Numerous other areas are certain to be pitfalls for the practic-
ing attorney unfamiliar with the installment land contract.171 Title
problems are of real concern in light of the purchaser's limited pro-
tection under this conveyancing device and the extended period of
required installment payments before the title is conveyed. A fed-
eral tax lien against the vendor may be superior to the .purchaser's
potential rights.17 2 The vendor's trustee in bankruptcy can reject
171. For example, the status and rights of a mortgagee of the purchaser
under an installment land contract have given rise to litigation concerning what
notice to vendor is sufficient to require him to notify the mortgagee of pending
forfeiture. See Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wash. 2d 470, 452 P.2d 222 (1969) (actual
notice, burden on mortgagee) criticized in Note, 45 WASH. L. REV. 645 (1970);
Davis & Son v. Mulligan, 88 Ala. 523, 6 So. 908 (1898) (recording by mortgagee
constitutes notice); Note, Mortgages-Mortgage of a Vendee's Interest in an In-
stallment Land Contract-Mortgagee's Rights upon Default, 43 Mo. L. REV. 371
(1978) ("Adoption of the actual notice rule would reward ignorance.")
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.17 (1976) provides:
Any person desiring a copy of any notice of default and sale under any
security instrument with power of sale upon real property may, at any
time subsequent to the recordation of the security instrument and prior
to the giving of notice of hearing ... [for foreclosure], cause to be filed
for record in the office of the register of deeds ... a duly acknowledged
request for a copy of such notice of sale.
This statute has apparently functioned well to give notice to subsequent mortga-
gees by requiring the prior mortgagee to mail notice of hearing 20 days in advance
of the hearing. This statute by its wording, "security instrument with power of
sale," does not apply to prior installment land contracts, but its principle should
be adopted if the legislature should choose to pass legislation governing install-
ment land contracts.
A second and related problem is what actions are open to the purchaser's
mortgagee for protection of his interest. The mortgagee should not be able simply
to satisfy the amount due under the installment land contract, cf. Bank of
Greensboro v. Clapps, 76 N.C. 482 (1877), because he would be in the anomalous
situation of having greater rights than a second mortgagee in a normal mortgage
situation-the right to acquire title without foreclosure. The mortgage analogy
should be followed in this situation and the mortgagee allowed to protect himself
by acquiring the vendor's interest, as an assignee of the vendor, after which he
could pursue vendor's remedies or by foreclosing the purchaser's interest which
the mortgagee could then acquire at the sale, subject to the rights of the vendor.
Thompson v. Justice, 88 N.C. 269 (1883). OSBORNE, NELSON AND WHITMAN § 3.32;
Note, Mortgages-Mortgage of a Vendee's Interest in an Installment Land Con-
tract-Mortgagee's Rights upon Default, 43 Mo. L. REv. 371, 374-76 (1978).
172. The Court in Leipert v. Williams & Co., 161 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y.
1957), interpreted I.R.S. §§ 6321, 6323 as protecting only those purchasers who
had acquired legal title to the property prior to the filling of a tax lien by the
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the contract, leaving the purchaser in the position of an unsecured
creditor. 7 If the vendor should die prior to executing a deed,
those upon whom his interest devolves may try to restrain a con-
government. However, Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(h)-l(f) (1976) now defines a pur-
chaser as one having an interest under a written executory contract to purchase
property which is valid under local law against subsequent purchasers without
actual notice. Recordation of the contract should therefore protect the purchaser.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18 (1976). See Lacy, The Effect of Federal Priority and Tax
Lien Legislation on Creditors of Vendors and Purchasers, 50 ORE. L. REV. 619
(1971).
173. (A) Bankruptcy: This is one instance where the purchaser's equity has
not been recognized as equivalent to that of a mortgagor. Section 70(c) of the
former bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (repealed 1979), allowed the trustee in
bankruptcy, where the contract was unrecorded, the rights of a lien creditor as of
the date of bankruptcy, thus relegating the purchaser to the status of a general
creditor. See Gottesman, The Onus of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Focus
on Vendors and Lessors, 4 PRAC. LAW. 65 (Apr. 1965); Levine, A Recipe for a Due
Process Explosion: Installment Land Contracts, Bankruptcy and General Credi-
tors, 82 COM. L.J. 51 (1977); Lacy, Land Sale Contracts in Bankruptcy, 21
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 477 (1974). Under Section 70(b) of the old Act, even where the
contract was recorded, 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (repealed 1979) gave the trustee the
power to "assume or reject an executory contract," which included executory land
contracts. In re Philadelphia Penn Worsted Co., 278 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1960). In In
re New York Investors Group, 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), criticized in
Note, 43 VA. L. REV. 253 (1957), the buyer made a down payment, seller agreeing
to convey the land in eighteen months (a binder contract) upon payment of the
balance of the purchase price. The seller was adjudged bankrupt after twelve
months and the trustee refused to assume the contract, leaving the buyer with
only a claim for breach of contract. Rejection set the buyer in the position of an
unsecured creditor unless he had a lien for the amount paid. The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 does not entirely alleviate these problems. See 11 U.S.C. §
544(a), 365(a) (Supp. II 1978). 11 U.S.C. § 365(i) (Supp. II 1978) does offer some
protection to a purchaser in possession who can acquire title under that section.
11 U.S.C. § 365(j) (Supp. II 1978) gives the purchaser under a contract that is
rejected or terminated a lien on the property to the extent of his payments.
(B) Receivership: The rights of the purchaser under an executory land con-
tract where the vendor is in state court receivership, N.C. GEN. STAr. §§ 1-501 et.
seq. (1969), have not been decided in North Carolina. The receiver takes title to
all property of the person in receivership under N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-502, 1-507.2
(1969) and is given broad authority. In the event the receiver takes action incon-
sistent with the contract, the purchaser should be entitled to rescission, Scott v.
Roberts, 230 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), or to sue for damages for the
breach, cf. Lamson Co. v. Morehead, 199 N.C. 164, 154 S.E. 50 (1930). No court
holding property through its receiver can be sued and forced specifically to per-
form a contract. See generally 2 R. CLARK, LAW OF RECEIVERS §§ 423, 428-30 (3d
ed. 1959); 75 C.J.S. Receivers § 169 (1952); 66 AM. JUR. 2d Receivers §§ 223, 224
(1973).
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veyance. 74 The vendor may default on a prior mortgage. 75
In the event of a condemnation proceeding the purchaser may
find he is not entitled to any recovery if the vendor can substan-
tially perform. The purchaser would probably have to enforce by
litigation whatever rights he may have if the entire premises are
condemned.17 6 Although an installment land contract may be an
effective estate planning tool with which to "freeze" the value of
real property, it must be carefully structured; it must be an arm's
length arrangement which can withstand the scrutiny usually given
such intra-family dealings.177
IV. FUTURE USE OF INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACTS IN NORTH
CAROLINA
Although this state has not experienced the abuses in the use
of installment land contracts which have prevailed in other states,
it is nevertheless apparent that this conveyancing device has the
potential to foster overreaching by vendors.
Courts in this and many other states have proceeded on what
may be considered a case by case basis, fashioning exceptions to
forfeiture on the facts of each case by finding waiver, estoppel,
penalty, or other unjust or unconscionable conduct or contract pro-
vision. The courts of California, basing their decisions broadly on
public policy and only partly on a statute'78 which had been on the
books when the famous Glock v. Howard'79 case was decided, have
denied forfeiture altogether and have given judicial recognition to
174. If there is not an executed deed held in escrow, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-
17-9 (1976) provides that the personal representative "may execute and deliver a
deed." The vendor's heirs may have some incentive he would not have had to
attempt to avoid the contract. See, e.g., Scott v. Jordan, 235 N.C. 244, 69 S.E.2d
577 (1952).
175. Rudolph, The Installment Land Contract as a Junior Security, 54
MICH. L. REV. 929 (1956).
176. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-104 (Supp. 1979). See 2 NICHOLS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN § 5.21[1] (1979); Note, Effect of Condemnation on Executory Contract to
Buy Land, 39 YALE L.J. 916 (1930); Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 572 (1969). North Caro-
lina's Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-39 (1976)
does not cover loss by condemnation. There are apparently no North Carolina
cases on this question.
177. See 14 MIAMI INST. ESTATE PLAN. § 1703 (1980).
178. Barkis v. Scott, 34 Cal.2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949) (construing CAL. Civ.
CODE § 3275 (1872).
179. 123 Cal. 1, 55 P. 713 (1898).
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the purchaser's right of redemption18" as well as to his right to res-
titution."8 ' Courts of other jurisdictions have taken the following
approaches: (1) fashioned a judicial grace period and recognized an
equity of redemption,18 2 (2) found waiver by the vendor,188 (3) rec-
ognized an equity of redemption in the purchaser, treating an in-
stallment land contract as a mortgage,1 84 (4) acknowledged the
purchaser's right to restitution of payments which exceed the ven-
dor's loss,' 85 and (5) ordered foreclosure as a mortgage.18' Undis-
putedly the trend is toward greater protection of the purchaser.
Nowhere can the vendor depend on effecting forfeiture strictly in
accordance with his contract in the event of default.1 87
The courts of North Carolina can hardly ignore the equities of
the purchaser under an installment land contract. Rather, if a judi-
cial approach 8 to alleviating the inequities of forfeiture is to be
adopted in this state, the most stabilizing and least disruptive
method would seem to be to recognize the purchaser's equity of
redemption to the extent of his payments and improvements if he
has equity in the property, and to protect that equity by ordering
foreclosure of the contract as a mortgage.18 9
The weight of authority, logic, and equitable notions supports
the proposition that installment land contracts are essentially se-
curity devices in the nature of purchase money mortgages and that
the purchaser's equitable interest, found worthy of the court's pro-
180. Petersen v. Ridenour, 135 Cal. App.2d 720, 287 P.2d 848 (1955).
181. Freedman v. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Mathias Parish, 37
Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951).
182. E.g., Ward v. Union Bond & Trust Co., 243 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1957);
Henry Uihlein Realty Co. v. Downtown Dev. Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 620, 101 N.W.2d
775 (1960).
183. E.g., Triplett v. Davis, 238 Ark. 870, 385 S.W.2d 33 (1964); Bradley v.
Apel, 531 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
184. E.g., Nelson v. Robinson, 184 Kan. 340, 336 P.2d 415 (1959); H & L
Land Co. v. Warner, 258 So. 2d 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
185. E.g., Lytel v. Scot. Am. Mortgage Co., 122 Ga. 458, 50 S.E. 402 (1905);
Walker v. Nunnenkamp, 84 Idaho 485, 373 P.2d 559 (1962).
186. E.g., Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind. 226, 301 N.E.2d 641 (1973), cert.
denied 415 U.S. 921, appeal after remand 264 Ind. 77, 339 N.E.2d 57 (1975).
187. OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN at 81.
188. It has been argued that such a role is improper for the judiciary.
Schwartz, Seller's Unequal Bargaining Power and the Judicial Process, 49 IND.
L.J. 367 (1974)..
189. Notwithstanding the dictum in Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 155
S.E.2d 532 (1967), that the vendor may forfeit the purchaser's interest, there is
ample precedent in this state for recognition of purchaser's equity by foreclosure.
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tection in so many respects, should not be sacrificed in the event of
an unredeemed default.190 This is not to say that forfeiture should
never be permitted. There are, of course, many situations in which
the installments paid may approximate the seller's damages. It is
not contended that the distinction between the installment land
contract and the purchase money mortgage should be abolished.
There is a demand for low equity financing with swift enforcement
of security upon default which the installment land contract offers.
This arrangement promotes credit transactions and offers advan-
tages to seller and buyer that the mortgage does not provide. But
recognizing the desirability of such a summary remedy by the ven-
dor does not mean that it should be granted in every case. When a
forfeiture penalizes the defaulting vendee, court supervision is
necessary.""1
Utilization of judicial foreclosure and sale procedures offers
not only the most equitable treatment for the parties, but also a
relief from the inflexibilities, inconsistencies, and fictions courts
have used when applying contract principles to installment land
contracts. Hundreds of years of mortgage precedents commend the
foreclosure and sale procedure. The vendor should get what he
bargained for (except for the penal forfeiture) plus his expenses
and the purchaser should take the risk of a decrease in value and
have the benefit of any appreciation after expenses of the sale. Use
of this procedure is a straightforward recognition of the contract as
a security device under which the purchaser's equities are pre-
served as against admittedly penal provisions of the contract. 9 ,
The legislatures of a number of states have recognized the
problems presented by forfeitures of installment land contracts
and have passed statutes attempting to alleviate the plight of the
defaulting purchaser. Many of the statutes impose a grace period
after default or notice of default during which the purchaser has
an opportunity to catch up his late payments.193 Other states have
provided that installment land contracts for residential property
190. See Note, Florida Installment Land Contracts: A Time for Reform, 28
U. FLA. L. REV. 156, 159 (1975).
191. Allen v. Taylor, 96 N.C. 37, 40, 1 S.E. 462, 463 (1887).
192. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-9-504 to -506 (1965) (Uniform Commer-
cial Code.)
193. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 656.1 -.6 (1950) (thirty days); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 559.21 (Supp. 1980) (up to sixty days depending on the percentage of the con-
tract price purchaser has paid); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-18-01 to -06 (1979) (one
year).
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will be treated as mortgages, "4 or that after a certain percentage of
the purchase price has been paid, mortgage rules will govern,195
thereby ensuring an equity of redemption. An Oklahoma statute
provides that installment land contracts will be "deemed" mort-
gages and subject to mortgage rules of foreclosure. 96 Numerous
thoughtful articles suggest and discuss legislative reforms."
97
Any statutory relief should be structured not only to provide
needed protection for the purchaser, but also to recognize and
make provisions for the vendor's vulnerability in the early stages of
the contract when the purchaser's payments may not have been
adequate to cover the vendor's expenses in the event of default
plus a fair rental return from the property. A summary remedy for
repossession by the vendor early in the contract period would rec-
ognize the legitimate need for this type of financing and would
protect the vendor without substantial risk to the purchaser. At
the point when the payments of the purchaser and his improve-
ments are sufficient to reimburse the vendor and reduce his risk of
loss upon an early termination of the contract, there seems to be
no reason not to treat the contract as a mortgage,19' either by stat-
utory decree or by requiring that the parties restructure their ar-
rangement."' s Other protections could be included such as allowing
194. E.g., MD. RULES, RULE W. 79 (Supp. 1978). Montana's statute, R.C.M. §
52-402 (1947), provides for a type of trust indenture to be used in sales of real
property of fifteen acres or less. It has an efficient foreclosure method requiring
no judicial proceedings and sale after default upon 120 days notice. See Note,
Toward Abolishing Installment Land Sale Contracts, 36 MONT. L. REV. 110
(1975).
195. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5313.01 -.10 (1970).
196. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § 11A (Supp. 1978). See Note, The Decline of
the Contract for Deed in Oklahoma, 14 TULSA L.J. 557 (1979).
197. E.g., Comment, The Installment Land Contract in Idaho: A Game of
Chance, 15 IDAHo L. REV. 89 (1978); Comment, Remedying the Inequities of For-
feiture in Land Installment Contracts, 64 IOWA L. REV. 158 (1978); Lee, Default-
ing Purchaser's Right to Restitution under the Installment Land Contract, 20 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1965); Note, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 620 (1959); Rudolph, The In-
stallment Land Contract as a Junior Security, 54 MICH. L. REV. 929 (1956).
198. See Note, Florida Installment Land Contracts: A Time for Reform, 28
U. FLA. L. REV. 156, 179 (1975); Comment, Remedying the Inequities of Forfei-
ture in Land Installment Contracts, 64 IOWA L. REV. 158, 172 (1978) (suggests
fifty percent of the contract price).
199. At some point where the purchaser has substantially performed, his eq-
uity should have such weight that the freedom of contract should be subordinated
to his interest in the nature of an equity of redemption. His investment at this
point is large and there is less chance he will default, and if he does the vendor
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progressive redemption periods in proportion to the percentage of
completion of the contract.2 00 Any legislative action should be com-
prehensive and should attempt to rectify the weaknesses of the in-
stallment land contract besides inequitable forfeiture. Recording
and priority problems should be addressed, and some procedure
should be deyised to require the vendor to show either that he has
marketable title or that he can with certainty convey marketable
title on the day specified in the contract. A statutory requirement
that a deed be executed and placed in escrow would prevent many
problems.
Any legislative reform should first address itself to the
problems presented by forfeiture and the incidents of the install-
ment land contract which go so far beyond the normal expecta-
tions of one or both of the contracting parties that the public good
requires relief. It is apparent that this device not only has full po-
tential for abuse by forfeiture" 1 but also, even when a well drawn
contract is used, it holds many pitfalls for the unwary vendor and
purchaser. Whether these are practical problems that require legis-
lative action is a matter for that body to study. The appellate re-
ports of this state do not indicate a crying need for legislative
action. 20 2
will likely be adequately protected. See Note, Reforming the Vendor's Remedies
for Breach of Installment Land Sale Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 191, 220
(1973), suggesting that "equitable doctrines should not operate to vest the vendee
with equitable rights until the vendee's equity in the property exceeds the ven-
dor's minimum damages incident to the breach of the installment land contract,"
and that prior to that time the contract should operate automatically to terminate
any interest the vendee has in the property.
200. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 33-741 (1974).
201. For an account of an investment scheme which allegedly swindled
thousands of investors out of millions of dollars, see Note, Florida Installment
Land Contracts: A Time for Reform, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 156, 182 (1975). See Dol-
son & Zile, Buying Farms on Installment Land Contracts, 1960 Wis. L. REV. 383
(a field study).
202. It has been observed that, "the legislative changes . . . are collectively
significant as one more indication of the shift from equity to legislation as the
principal means of legal growth-of the increasing suppression of the judge by the
legislator in the shaping of the legal order." Simpson, Legislative Changes in the
Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract: II, 44 YALE L.J. 754, 779 (1935). Hap-
pily, the North Carolina reports do not contain the examples of "mechanical juris-
prudence at its dreariest" which have been the basis for reform efforts in other
states.
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